green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of David-Hillel Ruben, by Text
[American, fl. 1990, At LSE, then Professor at NYU in London, and at Birkbeck, London]
|
1990
|
Explaining Explanation
|
|
Ch 1
|
p.7
|
17081
|
Usually explanations just involve giving information, with no reference to the act of explanation
|
|
Ch 1
|
p.9
|
17082
|
Paradox: why do you analyse if you know it, and how do you analyse if you don't?
|
|
Ch 4
|
p.124
|
17087
|
The 'symmetry thesis' says explanation and prediction only differ pragmatically
|
|
Ch 5
|
p.175
|
17088
|
Reducing one science to another is often said to be the perfect explanation
|
|
Ch 5
|
p.180
|
17089
|
Facts explain facts, but only if they are conceptualised or named appropriately
|
|
Ch 6
|
p.197
|
17090
|
Most explanations are just sentences, not arguments
|
|
Ch 7
|
p.210
|
17092
|
An explanation needs the world to have an appropriate structure
|
|
Ch 7
|
p.231
|
17094
|
The causal theory of explanation neglects determinations which are not causal
|