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Ideas of Howard Robinson, by Text
[British, fl. 1994, Liverpool University, and then the Central European University, Budapest.]
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1.1
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p.2
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6480
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Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality
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1.1
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p.2
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6481
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If intentional states are intrinsically about other things, what are their own properties?
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1.1
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p.3
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6482
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For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects
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1.2
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p.5
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6484
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Most moderate empiricists adopt Locke's representative theory of perception
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1.2
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p.7
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6485
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When a red object is viewed, the air in between does not become red
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1.7
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p.29
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6494
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If objects are not coloured, and neither are sense-contents, we are left saying that nothing is coloured
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III.1
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p.61
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6497
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We say objects possess no intrinsic secondary qualities because physicists don't need them
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III.1
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p.68
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6499
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Shape can be experienced in different ways, but colour and sound only one way
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III.1
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p.69
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6500
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If secondary qualities match senses, would new senses create new qualities?
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IX.3
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p.216
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6515
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An explanation presupposes something that is improbable unless it is explained
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IX.3
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p.216
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6517
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If all possibilities are equal, order seems (a priori) to need an explanation - or does it?
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IX.3
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p.220
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6519
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Locke's solidity is not matter, because that is impenetrability and hardness combined
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IX.3
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p.220
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6520
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If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features?
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IX.3
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p.222
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6521
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Representative realists believe that laws of phenomena will apply to the physical world
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IX.4
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p.226
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6522
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Phenomenalism can be theistic (Berkeley), or sceptical (Hume), or analytic (20th century)
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V.1
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p.121
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6502
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Can we reduce perception to acquisition of information, which is reduced to causation or disposition?
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V.4
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p.136
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6503
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Physicalism cannot allow internal intentional objects, as brain states can't be 'about' anything
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V.4
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p.137
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6504
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For physicalists, the only relations are spatial, temporal and causal
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VII.1
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p.163
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6505
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Sense-data are rejected because they are a veil between us and reality, leading to scepticism
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VII.5
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p.174
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6506
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'Sense redly' sounds peculiar, but 'senses redly-squarely tablely' sounds far worse
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VII.5
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p.175
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6507
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Adverbialism sees the contents of sense-experience as modes, not objects
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VII.5
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p.176
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6511
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If there are only 'modes' of sensing, then an object can no more be red or square than it can be proud or lazy.
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VII.5
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p.176
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6508
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Sense-data leads to either representative realism or phenomenalism or idealism
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VII.5
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p.176
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6509
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Representative realists believe some properties of sense-data are shared by the objects themselves
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VIII.7
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p.207
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6513
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Would someone who recovered their sight recognise felt shapes just by looking?
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VIII.7
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p.207
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6512
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Secondary qualities have one sensory mode, but primary qualities can have more
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