| 1997 | Contemporary Philosophy of Mind |
| 1.1 | p.14 | 3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism |
| 1.1.1 | p.15 | 3137 | Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars |
| 1.1.2 | p.19 | 3138 | Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia |
| 1.1.2 | p.19 | 3139 | Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) |
| 1.2.1 | p.22 | 3140 | If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it |
| 10.1.1 | p.265 | 3213 | Animals may also use a language of thought |
| 10.1.2 | p.266 | 3215 | Images can't replace computation, as they need it |
| 10.2.1 | p.271 | 3216 | Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker? |
| 10.2.3 | p.274 | 3220 | Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part |
| 11.1 | p.289 | 3221 | Our desires become important when we have desires about desires |
| 11.2.2 | p.292 | 3223 | Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality |
| 11.4.2 | p.300 | 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental |
| 11.6.1 | p.307 | 3226 | Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? |
| 11.6.1 | p.308 | 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? |
| 11.7.1 | p.310 | 3229 | If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion |
| 2.1 | p.42 | 3141 | Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex? |
| 2.1 | p.43 | 3142 | Why qualia, and why this particular quale? |
| 2.3 | p.46 | 3143 | Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic |
| 2.4 | p.49 | 3145 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds |
| 2.5.3 | p.54 | 3147 | Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images |
| 2.5.4 | p.55 | 3148 | Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach |
| 2.5.6 | p.58 | 3149 | Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta') |
| 2.7 | p.64 | 3150 | Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience? |
| 3.2.2 | p.84 | 3162 | Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives |
| 3.2.2 | p.85 | 3163 | Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious |
| 3.3 | p.89 | 3164 | Intentional explanations are always circular |
| 4 | p.96 | 3165 | Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological |
| 4.1.1 | p.99 | 3166 | Animal learning is separate from their behaviour |
| 4.1.4 | p.103 | 3167 | Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment |
| 4.2.1 | p.110 | 3169 | A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then' |
| 4.2.1 | p.113 | 3170 | We train children in truth, not in grammar |
| 4.2.4 | p.119 | 3171 | Children speak 90% good grammar |
| 4.3 | p.122 | 3172 | Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge |
| 4.3 | p.124 | 3173 | How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? |
| 4.3 | p.126 | 3174 | Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli |
| 4.3 | p.126 | 3175 | Animals map things over time as well as over space |
| 4.3 | p.127 | 3176 | Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one |
| 5.3 | p.154 | 3179 | Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind |
| 5.3 | p.154 | 3180 | Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group |
| 5.4 | p.156 | 3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be |
| 7.1.4 | p.189 | 3186 | If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind? |
| 7.2.2 | p.195 | 3188 | Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes |
| 8.5 | p.218 | 3194 | CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason |
| 8.6 | p.221 | 3196 | Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will |
| 8.6 | p.221 | 3195 | If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will' |
| 8.8 | p.226 | 3200 | Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism |
| 8.8 | p.226 | 3199 | Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes |
| 8.8 | p.227 | 3201 | Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation' |
| 8.8 | p.231 | 3202 | Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well |
| 9.1.2 | p.239 | 3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" |
| 9.1.2 | p.240 | 3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts |
| 9.1.3 | p.241 | 3206 | One computer program could either play chess or fight a war |
| 9.2 | p.241 | 3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object |
| 9.2.1 | p.242 | 3209 | Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers |
| 9.2.2 | p.243 | 3210 | If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning |
| Int.2 | p.3 | 3127 | Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research |
| Int.2 | p.5 | 3128 | It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere |
| Int.2 | p.6 | 3129 | Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance |
| Int.3 | p.7 | 3134 | Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain |
| p.322 | p.322 | 3232 | Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned |
| 2013 | The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction |
| 1.2 | p.3 | 20293 | Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed |
| 1.2 | p.3 | 20294 | 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity |
| 3.7 | p.9 | 20297 | Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable |
| 3.7 | p.9 | 20298 | The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience |
| 4.1 | p.11 | 20299 | If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical? |
| 4.2 | p.11 | 20300 | Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena |
| 4.3 | p.12 | 20301 | The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used |
| 4.4 | p.13 | 20302 | An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical) |
| 4.4 | p.14 | 20303 | Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity |