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Ideas of Adolph Rami, by Text
[German, fl. 2009, At the University of Göttingen.]
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2008
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Essential vs Accidental Properties
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p.7
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10938
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The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones
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§1
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p.4
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10933
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Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility
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§1
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p.4
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10932
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If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible'
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§1
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p.5
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10934
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Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties
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§4
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p.9
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10939
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'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential
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§5
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p.10
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10940
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An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object
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2009
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Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making
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03
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p.3
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18333
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Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths
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04
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p.5
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18335
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There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve
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04
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p.5
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18334
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The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal
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05
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p.8
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18336
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Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties
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05
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p.8
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18338
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Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist
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05
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p.8
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18337
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Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation
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05
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p.9
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18339
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The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many
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05
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p.9
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18340
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It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events
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06
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p.10
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18341
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Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties
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07
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p.16
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18342
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Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths
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08
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p.25
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18343
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Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth
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09
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p.29
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18345
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'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths
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09
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p.29
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18346
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'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths
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10
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p.32
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18347
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Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property
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note 16
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p.15
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18350
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Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula
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