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Ideas of Duncan Pritchard, by Text
[British, fl. 2005, University of Sterling, then Professor at the University of Edinburgh.]
2012
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Epistemological Disjunctivism
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Intro
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p.2
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19495
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Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility
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Intro
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p.3
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19496
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Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent
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1.§4
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p.23
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19497
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Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences
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1.§6
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p.36
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19498
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Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection
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2.§3
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p.74
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19499
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We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that
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2.§3
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p.76
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19500
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Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second
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2.§5
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p.85
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19501
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We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges
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2.§6
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p.89
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19502
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Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases
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2.n2
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p.101
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19503
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An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world
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3.§2
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p.114
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19505
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Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [PG]
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3.§2
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p.114
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19504
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My modus ponens might be your modus tollens
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3.§3
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p.119
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19506
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Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism
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3.§5
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p.126
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19507
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Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence
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