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Ideas of John L. Pollock, by Text
[American, fl. 1984, Professor at the University of Arizona, Tucson.]
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'Cog.Mach'
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p.213
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8818
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Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts
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'Cog.Mach'
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p.214
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8819
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We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning
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'Cog.Mach'
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p.215
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8820
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Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it
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'Dir.Realism'
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p.220
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8823
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Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief
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'Ep.Norms'
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p.192
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8811
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What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something?
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'Ep.Norms'
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p.193
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8812
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Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external
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'How regulate?'
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p.194
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8813
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If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress
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'How regulate?'
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p.196
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8814
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Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning
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'Nat.Internal'
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p.219
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8822
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Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true
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'Ref.of Extern'
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p.197
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8815
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Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use
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'Ref.of Extern'
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p.199
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8816
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Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology
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'Ref.of Extern'
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p.204
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8817
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Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant
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