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Ideas of Derek Parfit, by Text
[British, 1942 - 2017, Fellow of All Soul's College, Oxford.]
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p.269
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3539
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Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Maslin]
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§1
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p.203
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1392
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If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us
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§5
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p.219
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1393
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One of my future selves will not necessarily be me
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§6
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p.220
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1391
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Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it
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§116
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p.341
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9762
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We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves
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1995
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The Unimportance of Identity
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p.293
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p.293
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5514
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Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity
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p.293
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p.293
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5515
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Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth
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p.295
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p.295
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5516
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Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [PG]
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p.302
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p.302
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5518
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It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system)
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p.308
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p.308
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5519
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It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant
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p.310
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p.310
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5520
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If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem
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p.314
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p.314
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5521
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If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity
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p.316
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p.316
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5522
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Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity
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