| 1984 | Truth-makers |
| §2 | p.61 | 10906 | Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers |
| Full Idea: A 'moment' is an existentially dependent or non-self-sufficient object, that is, an object which is of such a nature that it cannot exist alone, ....... and we suggest that moments could serve as truth-makers. | |||
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §2) | |||
| A reaction: [These three writers invented the term 'truth-maker'] |
| §3 | p.67 | 10907 | The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items |
| Full Idea: A proposition may have a minimal truth-maker which is not unique, or a sentence may be made true by no single truth-maker but only by several jointly, or again only by several separately. | |||
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| §3 | p.70 | 10909 | Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true |
| Full Idea: Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true, because sentences with more than one truth-maker would then be ambiguous, and 'a' and 'a exists' would have the same designatum. | |||
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| §3 | p.70 | 10908 | Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers |
| Full Idea: The correspondence theory of truth invokes a special category of non-objectual entities - facts, states of affairs, or whatever - simply to serve as truth-makers. | |||
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §3) |
| §6 | p.77 | 10911 | Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers |
| Full Idea: The most important (ontological) relations holding among truth-makers are the part and whole relations. | |||
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) | |||
| A reaction: Hence Peter Simons goes off and writes the best known book on mereology. Looks very promising to me. |
| §6 | p.82 | 10912 | Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences |
| Full Idea: Because of negative propositions, investigators of truth-makers have said that they are special non-objectual entities with a logical complexity, but we think a theory is possible in which the truth relation is tied to ordinary and scientific experience. | |||
| From: Mulligan/Simons/Smith (Truth-makers [1984], §6) |