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Ideas of George Molnar, by Text
[Australian, 1934 - 1999, Born in Hungary. Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney.]
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1.1
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p.21
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11912
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Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means
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1.2
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p.24
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11913
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For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts
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1.2
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p.25
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11914
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Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding
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1.4.1
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p.30
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11915
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If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties
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1.4.2
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p.31
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11916
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'Being physical' is a second-order property
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1.4.3
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p.36
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11917
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Structural properties are derivate properties
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1.4.4
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p.37
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11918
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The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it
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1.4.4
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p.38
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11919
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Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection
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1.4.4
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p.38
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11920
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A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity
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1.4.5
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p.41
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11921
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The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round
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1.4.5
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p.42
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11927
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Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic
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1.4.6
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p.43
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11928
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Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism
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10.2
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p.158
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11956
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'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers
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10.3
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p.163
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11957
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It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world
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11.3
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p.184
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11959
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Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true
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12.1
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p.187
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11960
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Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization
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12.1
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p.187
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11961
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Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa
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12.2.2
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p.210
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11962
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Nominalists only accept first-order logic
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12.2.2
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p.211
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11963
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What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible?
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158-62
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p.187
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9448
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Location in space and time are non-power properties [Mumford]
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2 Intr
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p.47
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11929
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The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations
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2.1
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p.51
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11930
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One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others
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2.2
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p.53
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11931
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Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small
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2.4
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p.57
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11932
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Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity
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3.1
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p.60
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11933
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A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation
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3.2
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p.61
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11934
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The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality
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3.4
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p.63
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11935
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Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness
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3.5.3
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p.71
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11936
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The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness
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4.2.3
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p.93
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11937
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We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa
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4.3.1
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p.97
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11939
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If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers
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5
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p.101
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11943
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Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world
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6.1
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p.104
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11944
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Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles
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6.3
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p.109
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11947
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Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects
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7.2.3
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p.123
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11951
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Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid
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8.4.3
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p.135
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11952
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The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers
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8.5.2
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p.140
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11953
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Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative
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8.5.3
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p.141
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11954
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We should analyse causation in terms of powers
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9.1.2
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p.147
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11955
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There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts
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