| 2007 | Introduction to 'New Pragmatists' |
| p.2 | p.2 | 23277 | Modern pragmatism sees objectivity as possible, despite its gradual evolution |
| 2007 | Pragmatism and Deflationism |
| 1 | p.69 | 19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible |
| 2 | p.73 | 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories |
| 2 | p.74 | 19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling |
| 2 | p.74 | 19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... |
| 2 n10 | p.75 | 19101 | Disquotation is bivalent |
| 2 n7 | p.72 | 19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory |
| 3 | p.77 | 19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it |
| 3 | p.77 | 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language |
| 3 | p.79 | 19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries |
| 4 | p.81 | 19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? |
| 4 | p.86 | 19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards |
| 4 | p.87 | 19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry |