| 1997 | Introduction to 'Properties' |
| §1 | p.1 | 4027 | Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ |
| Full Idea: Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ. | |||
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §1) | |||
| A reaction: Note that this definition does not mention a causal role for properties. |
| §10 | p.23 | 4039 | Abstractions lack causes, effects and spatio-temporal locations |
| Full Idea: Abstract entities (such as sets) are usually understood as lacking causes, effects, and spatio-temporal location. | |||
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §10) | |||
| A reaction: This seems to beg some questions. Has the ideal of 'honour' never caused anything? Young men dream of pure velocity. |
| §3 | p.4 | 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all |
| Full Idea: Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all. | |||
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §3) | |||
| A reaction: Objects might be grasped without language, but events cannot be understood, and explanations of events seem inconceivable without properties (implying that they are essentially causal). |
| §9 | p.22 | 4037 | Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities |
| Full Idea: Ockham's Razor is the principle that we need reasons to believe in entities. | |||
| From: DH Mellor / A Oliver (Introduction to 'Properties' [1997], §9) | |||
| A reaction: This presumably follows from an assumption that all beliefs need reasons, but is that the case? The Principle of Sufficient Reason precedes Ockham's Razor. |