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Ideas of Ian McFetridge, by Text
[British, fl. 1986, At Birkbeck College, London. Died young.]
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1977
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Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge
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II
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p.38
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18487
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We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true'
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II
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p.39
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18488
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We normally explain natural events by citing further facts
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1986
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Logical Necessity: Some Issues
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p.96
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15083
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The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [Hale]
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p.97
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15084
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In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [Hale]
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§1
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p.136
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12180
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Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary
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§1
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p.136
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12181
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Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities
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§1
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p.137
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12183
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It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false
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§1
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p.137
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12182
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We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility
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§1
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p.138
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12184
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Logical necessity overrules all other necessities
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§2
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p.140
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12186
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Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts
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§2
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p.141
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12187
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Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world
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§4
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p.153
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12192
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The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever
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