| 1954 | Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' |
| p.44 | 14644 | If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain | |
| Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain. | |||
| From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44 | |||
| A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling? |
| 1959 | Anselm's Argument |
| §2 | p.56 | 1422 | God's existence is either necessary or impossible, and no one has shown that the concept of God is contradictory |
| Full Idea: God's existence is either impossible or necessary. It can be the former only if the concept of such a being is self-contradictory or in some way logically absurd. Assuming that this is not so, it follows that He necessarily exists. | |||
| From: Norman Malcolm (Anselm's Argument [1959], §2) | |||
| A reaction: The concept of God suggests paradoxes of omniscience, omnipotence and free will, so self-contradiction seems possible. How should we respond if the argument suggests God is necessary, but evidence suggests God is highly unlikely? |