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Ideas of Penelope Mackie, by Text

[British, fl. 2006, Lecturer at the University of Nottingham.]

2006	How Things Might Have Been

1.1

p.1

11877

An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without

10.1

p.172

11906

The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications

10.1

p.172

11905

Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind

10.1.

p.198

11909

Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary

10.2

p.173

11907

Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not

2.1/2

p.19

11882

No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object

2.2

p.21

11883

A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing

2.2 n7

p.21

11884

The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities

2.5

p.25

11886

There are problems both with individual essences and without them

2.7

p.30

11887

Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'

2.8

p.34

11889

Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences

4.1

p.71

11890

De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts

5.3

p.86

11892

Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation

6.5

p.108

11893

Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar

6.9

p.116

11894

Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions

8.2

p.134

11897

A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time

8.5

p.141

11898

Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence

8.6

p.144

11899

Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?