green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of J.L. Mackie, by Text
[Australian, 1917 - 1982, Born in Sydney. At University College, Oxford University.]
|
1955
|
Evil and Omnipotence
|
|
§B
|
p.95
|
1473
|
Is evil an illusion, or a necessary contrast, or uncontrollable, or necessary for human free will? [PG]
|
|
Pref.
|
p.92
|
1472
|
The propositions that God is good and omnipotent, and that evil exists, are logically contradictory [PG]
|
|
1965
|
Causes and Conditions
|
|
|
p.70
|
8342
|
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim]
|
|
|
p.71
|
8343
|
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim]
|
|
|
p.189
|
8385
|
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Crane]
|
|
|
p.407
|
8395
|
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Tooley]
|
|
§1
|
p.34
|
8333
|
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition
|
|
§3
|
p.47
|
8334
|
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause
|
|
§4
|
p.48
|
8335
|
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals
|
|
§9
|
p.52
|
8336
|
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known
|
|
§9
|
p.54
|
8337
|
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences
|
|
1977
|
Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong
|
|
|
p.107
|
4761
|
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Engel]
|