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Ideas of Fraser MacBride, by Text
[British, fl. 2004, Reader at Birkbeck College, London, then at Cambridge, then Manchester.]
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2007
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Structuralism Reconsidered
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§1
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p.563
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8923
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Numbers are identified by their main properties and relations, involving the successor function
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§3
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p.585
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8926
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For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first
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1.1
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p.3
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18466
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If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth
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1.6
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p.10
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18471
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Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation
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1.6
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p.10
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18472
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Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'?
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2.1
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p.11
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18473
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'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker
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2.1.1
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p.11
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18474
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Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have
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2.1.3
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p.12
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18475
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Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts
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2.1.4
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p.13
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18476
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'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind')
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2.1.4.1
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p.14
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18479
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There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth
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2.1.4.1
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p.14
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18477
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There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths
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2.1.4.1
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p.14
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18478
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Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours
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2.1.4.2
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p.16
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18480
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Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)?
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2.2
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p.17
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18481
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Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein
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2.2
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p.18
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18482
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Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths
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2.4.1
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p.20
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18483
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The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters
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3.1
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p.22
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18484
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Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers
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3.1
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p.22
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18485
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Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent
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3.3
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p.23
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18486
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We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation
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3.7
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p.26
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18490
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Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'?
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3.7
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p.26
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18489
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Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings
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3.8
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p.27
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18493
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Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification
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1
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p.2
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21352
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'Multigrade' relations are those lacking a fixed number of relata
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3
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p.5
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21354
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It may be that internal relations like proportion exist, because we directly perceive it
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3
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p.5
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21353
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Internal relations are fixed by existences, or characters, or supervenience on characters
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