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Ideas of C.I. Lewis, by Text
[American, 1883 - 1964, Born at Stoneham. Professor at Harvard University.]
1923
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A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori
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p.365
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p.365
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9357
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Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience
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p.366
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p.366
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9358
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There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth
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p.367
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p.367
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9362
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Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what
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p.367
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p.367
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9361
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We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction
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p.368
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p.368
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9363
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Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions
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p.368
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p.368
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9364
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Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing
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p.373
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p.373
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9365
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We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them
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1932
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Symbolic Logic (with Langford)
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p.180
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7803
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Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Girle]
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p.13
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7791
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The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Girle]
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p.118
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11002
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Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Read]
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1946
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An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation
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p.17
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5828
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Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension
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186
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p.6
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6556
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If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain
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334
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p.35
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21500
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We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another
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338
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p.13
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21498
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Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set
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358
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p.50
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21501
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If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted
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