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Ideas of David Lewis, by Text

[American, 1941 - 2001, Pupil of Willard Quine. Professor at Princeton University.]

1966 An Argument for the Identity Theory
§I p.100 7441 Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states
§II n6 p.101 7442 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain
1968 Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic
p.45 16994 Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke]
I p.28 11974 Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
I p.29 11975 If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
III p.32 11976 Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification
III p.35 11977 Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
Post B p.41 11979 It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election
V p.37 11978 Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature
1970 Anselm and Actuality
p.83 16456 For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Stalnaker]
1970 How to Define Theoretical Terms
Intro p.78 15527 Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination
Intro p.78 15526 There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand
II p.81 15528 A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what
III p.83 15529 It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible
III p.86 15530 A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world
V p.89 15531 The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation
1972 Psychophysical and theoretical identifications
p.9 9409 Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Mumford]
p.45 9423 If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford]
p.45 9424 A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford]
1973 Causation
p.37 9476 If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird]
p.148 4795 Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ]
p.161 17524 Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Bird]
p.162 10392 It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause
p.162 17525 The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Bird]
p.409 8397 Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley]
p.454 8405 A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Field,H]
p.193 p.193 8420 A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
p.193 p.193 8419 The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions
p.194 p.194 8421 Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted
p.195 p.195 8423 My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
p.196 p.196 8424 Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ
p.197 p.197 8425 For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
p.200 p.200 8426 One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
p.203 p.203 8427 I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted
1973 Counterfactuals
p.213 8434 In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Horwich]
p.224 14361 Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Jackson]
3.3 p.73 9419 A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength
1973 Possible Worlds
p.288 15789 Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan]
p.295 15790 Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan]
p.297 15791 What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan]
1973 works
p.5 4398 An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Psillos]
1976 The paradoxes of time travel
p.194 23019 The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Baron/Miller]
p.202 23021 Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Baron/Miller]
1976 Probabilities of Conditionals
p.14 14283 A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Edgington]
1979 Attitudes De Dicto and De Se
p.89 18415 The actual world is just the world you are in [Cappelen/Dever]
p.90 18416 Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Solomon]
p.108 18418 A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Cappelen/Dever]
p.249 16390 Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Recanati]
p.255 16392 A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Recanati]
1979 Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow
p.209 8433 There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Horwich]
1980 Mad Pain and Martian Pain
§II p.123 7443 A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [PG]
§III p.124 7444 Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain
§III p.125 7445 The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent
1980 Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance
p.124 p.46 9425 Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford]
1983 Extrinsic Properties
p.4 14979 Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Sider]
I p.111 15454 Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling'
I p.112 15455 Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is
1983 Introduction to Philosophical Papers I
p.1 p.-5 21461 I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views
1983 Survival and Identity, with postscript
p.610 16079 De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Rudder Baker]
1983 New work for a theory of universals
p.18 10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Oliver]
p.18 21961 Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Moore,AW]
p.29 14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Koslicki]
p.98 16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Hawley]
p.128 7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Heil]
p.211 15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Hawthorne]
'1 Ov Many' p.198 8605 In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive
'1 Ov Many' p.199 8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
'Cont of L' p.220 8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
'Cont of L' p.220 8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated
'Cont of L' p.221 8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains
'Cont of L' p.224 8615 We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity
'Cont of L' p.224 8614 A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth
'Cont of L' p.227 8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes
'Dup,Sup,Div' p.203 15727 Physics aims for a list of natural properties
'Dup,Sup,Div' p.205 8607 Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability
'Dup,Sup,Div' p.205 8606 A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation
'Dup,Sup,Div' p.208 8608 Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past
'Intro' p.188 8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done
'Laws and C' p.215 8611 A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system
'Laws and C' p.217 8584 Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption
'Min Mat' p.210 8579 Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism
'Min Mat' p.212 8580 Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically
'Min Mat' p.212 8581 Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required
p.355-7 p.130 15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis]
'Un and Prop' p.189 8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things
'Un and Prop' p.190 8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around
'Un and Prop' p.191 8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant
'Un and Prop' p.192 15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals
'Un and Prop' p.192 18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify
'Un and Prop' p.192 8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
'Un and Prop' p.194 8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions
'Un and Prop' n9 p.194 8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same
1984 Putnam's Paradox
'Glob Desc' p.60 14209 Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications)
'What Is' p.77 14215 Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy
'What Might' p.65 14210 A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints
'Why Anti-R' p.71 14213 Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth
'Why Model' p.68 14212 A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those
1986 Causal Explanation
p.237 4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Psillos]
I p.215 15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry.
I p.215 15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right'
I p.216 15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events
II p.217 14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history
III p.223 15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property?
IV p.225 15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws
IV p.225 15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match
V p.228 15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen
V p.228 15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty
V n7 p.226 15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components
VI p.230 15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur
1986 Events
I p.241 15561 The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation
I p.242 15562 Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence
II p.245 15564 An event is a property of a unique space-time region
II n2 p.244 15563 Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables
III p.247 15565 Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence
V p.258 15566 Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts
VI p.261 15567 Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges
1986 Introduction to Philosophical Papers II
p.-10 9426 The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact
p.ix-x p.-10 16210 Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time
1986 Comment on Armstrong and Forrest
p.109 p.109 15452 We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures
p.110 p.110 15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory
1986 On the Plurality of Worlds
p.7 10470 There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Oliver]
p.7 16441 Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Stalnaker]
p.79 7690 If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette]
p.112 14404 The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Merricks]
p.115 5441 Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner]
p.115 5440 A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Mautner]
p.127 12255 For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg]
p.194 9219 Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Sider]
p.248 15022 If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider]
§1.5 p.269 15399 The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Cameron]
1.2 p.15 9650 Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion
1.2 n3 p.7 16132 On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported
1.2 n3 p.7 16133 Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions
1.3 p.24 9651 Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact
1.4 p.38 9652 To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
1.5 p.22 10723 A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Oliver]
1.5 p.50 9653 It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances
1.5 p.51 15733 Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances
1.5 p.51 15732 Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set
1.5 p.52 15734 If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too
1.5 p.53 15735 Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them
1.5 p.53 9654 A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property
1.5 p.53 15736 A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true
1.5 p.55 9655 Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
1.5 p.55 15737 To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role
1.5 p.57 15738 Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds
1.5 p.59 15739 There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets
1.5 p.59 9656 The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy
1.5 p.60 14996 Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity...
1.5 p.61 15741 All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties
1.5 p.61 15742 A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic
1.5 p.63 15743 Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular
1.5 p.63 15744 We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance
1.5 p.64 15745 Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common
1.5 p.65 15746 If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle
1.5 p.65 15748 Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
1.5 p.65 15749 Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates
1.5 p.65 15750 Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity
1.5 p.65 15747 Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be
1.5 p.66 9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it
1.5 p.67 15751 Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed?
1.5 p.73 9658 An explanation tells us how an event was caused
1.5 n37 p.51 15731 Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes')
1.5 n44 p.60 15740 I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world
1.5 n47 p.67 15752 We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them
1.6 p.73 10469 A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things
1.6 p.78 9659 Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either
1.7 p.82 8901 Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively
1.7 p.82 8938 The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers?
1.7 p.83 8903 Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets
1.7 p.83 8902 If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations
1.7 p.84 8904 The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction
1.7 p.85 8906 If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes
1.7 p.85 8905 If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts
1.7 p.85 8908 For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction
1.7 p.85 8907 The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it
1.7 p.86 8909 Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object
1.8 p.90 9660 The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague
2.3 p.106 16278 A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought
2.4 p.109 16279 General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
2.5 p.116 9661 Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed
2.7 p.131 16280 Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories
2.7 p.133 16274 If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising
2.8 p.135 16281 Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense
239- p.155 11903 Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Mackie,P]
248-263 p.18 13793 An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Elder]
3.1 p.136 16282 Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been
3.1 p.138 16283 For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself
3.1 p.141 16284 Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically
3.2 p.145 16286 Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing
3.2 p.151 16287 Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together
3.2 p.154 16288 Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge)
3.2 p.165 9662 Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary
3.3 p.173 16289 We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist
3.4 p.189 16290 I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals
4.1 p.192 15968 Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing
4.1 p.193 15969 Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem
4.1 p.197 16291 In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings
4.2 p.202 9663 A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times
4.2 p.203 9664 Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape
4.2 p.204 9665 There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure
4.2 p.207 9666 It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything
4.3 p.211 9667 Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum
4.4 p.221 15129 Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity
4.4 p.230 9669 There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
4.4 p.239 9670 Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg
4.4 n32 p.244 9057 Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express
4.5 p.251 9671 Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision
4.5 p.252 19280 I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential
p.202-4 p.95 14737 Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Sider]
p.212-3 p.121 13268 There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Sider]
p.60- p.85 16262 Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Maudlin]
p.61-2 p.268 15397 If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron]
p.61-2 p.268 15398 Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron]
1986 Modal Realism at Work: Properties
p.23 4038 Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Mellor/Oliver]
1986 Against Structural Universals
'Intro' p.79 15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
'The magical' p.100 15448 The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts
'The magical' p.101 15449 If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals
'The pictorial' p.90 15439 The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts
'The pictorial' p.91 15441 The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over
'The pictorial' p.91 15440 A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
'The pictorial' p.93 15443 Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one
'Uninstantiated' p.103 15450 Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
'Uninstantiated' p.107 15451 I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
'Variants' p.95 15444 Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times
'Variants' p.96 15445 Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures
'Variants' p.97 15446 Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples
'What are' p.81 15434 Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts
'Why believe' p.82 15435 If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate
'Why believe' p.82 15436 Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance
'Why believe' p.85 15437 We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals
'Why believe' p.86 15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism
1988 Rearrangement of Particles
1 p.188 15540 You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times)
1988 Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood
p.318 p.318 16458 Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language
1990 Noneism or Allism?
p.152 p.152 15532 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones
p.159 p.159 15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names
p.159 p.159 15534 We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties
p.163 p.163 15535 We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist
1991 Parts of Classes
p.80 10191 Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [MacBride]
p.118 18395 Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Armstrong]
p.137 14244 Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley]
p.372 10566 Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Fine,K]
Pref p.-4 15496 We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton
Pref p.-3 15497 We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology)
1.2 p.4 15498 We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything
1.2 p.5 15500 Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way
1.2 p.5 15499 A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member
1.2 p.8 15501 We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture
1.4 p.11 15502 There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set
1.4 p.13 15503 We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality!
1.8 p.20 15504 Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts
2.1 p.31 15507 Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it
2.1 p.31 15506 If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes
2.1 p.32 15508 If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets
2.1 n2 p.33 15509 Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars
2.2 p.37 15511 If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another?
2.3 p.39 15512 In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms
2.5 p.43 15513 Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso?
2.6 p.50 15514 A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory
2.6 p.53 15515 To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations
2.7 p.55 15516 A property is any class of possibilia
2.8 p.58 15517 Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy
3.2 n2 p.63 15518 I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic
3.5 p.80 15520 Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified
3.5 p.80 15519 Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power
3.6 p.81 15521 Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality
3.6 p.87 15522 The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six
3.6 p.87 14748 The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical
3.6 p.87 15523 Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it
4.6 p.111 15524 Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory
4.7 p.120 15525 Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system
p.81 p.17 10660 A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it
p.84-7 p.20 6129 Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Merricks]
1992 Armstrong on combinatorial possibility
p.207 p.207 14399 Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on
'The demand' p.203 15545 Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions
'The demand' p.204 15546 Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists
'Truth' p.206 15548 Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly
'What is there' p.200 15543 How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine
1993 Many, but almost one
'A better solution' p.174 15539 Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it
'The paradox' p.167 15537 If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many
'The problem' p.164 15536 We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it
'Two solutions' p.170 15538 Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about)
1993 Mathematics is Megethology
p.03 p.3 10807 Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function
p.03 p.3 10806 Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology
p.03 p.3 10808 Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions
p.05 p.5 10809 We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members
p.07 p.7 10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion
p.09 p.9 10812 The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality
p.09 p.9 10811 The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence
p.12 p.12 10813 What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element?
p.13 p.13 10814 Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates?
p.16 p.16 10815 We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions
p.18 p.18 10816 We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations
1994 Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)
p.412 p.412 3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth
p.412 p.412 3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything
p.414 p.414 3991 Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction
p.416 p.416 3992 Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles
p.419 p.419 3993 Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe
p.420 p.420 3994 Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else
p.421 p.421 3995 A mind is an organ of representation
p.422 p.422 3996 Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought
p.424 p.424 3998 If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs
p.424 p.424 3997 Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
p.425 p.425 3999 A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs
p.430 p.430 4000 Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things
1995 Should a materialist believe in qualia?
p.327 p.327 8209 Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible
1996 Elusive Knowledge
p.68 12895 Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Cohen,S]
p.80 19562 We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Cohen,S]
p.421 12898 Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge
p.419 p.419 12897 To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction
p.429 p.429 12899 The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer
1997 Finkish dispositions
I p.134 15461 A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs
I p.136 15462 Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents
II p.140 15463 All dispositions must have causal bases
II p.144 15464 The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion
1998 Defining 'Intrinsic' (with Rae Langton)
p.272 15400 We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Cameron]
IV p.121 15458 A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates
IV p.121 15457 Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both
V p.122 15459 Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects
1998 A world of truthmakers?
p.220 p.220 15549 If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker?
2001 Forget the 'correspondence theory of truth'
p.279 10847 Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth
p.276 p.276 10845 To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive
p.277 p.277 10846 Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one
2003 Things qua Truthmakers
p.26 p.91 14401 Every proposition is entirely about being