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Ideas of Martin Kusch, by Text
[British, fl. 2002, Professor of Philosophy and Sociology of Science at the University of Cambridge.]
2002
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Knowledge by Agreement
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Intro
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p.1
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10323
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Communitarian Epistemology says 'knowledge' is a social status granted to groups of people
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Intro
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p.12
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10324
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Testimony does not just transmit knowledge between individuals - it actually generates knowledge
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Intro
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p.13
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10325
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Vindicating testimony is an expression of individualism
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Ch. 4
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p.30
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10327
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Some want to reduce testimony to foundations of perceptions, memories and inferences
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Ch. 4
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p.32
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10329
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Testimony won't reduce to perception, if perception depends on social concepts and categories
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Ch. 4
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p.38
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10331
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Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs
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Ch. 4
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p.42
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10332
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Omniscience is incoherent, since knowledge is a social concept
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Ch. 4 n7
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p.37
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10330
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A foundation is what is intelligible, hence from a rational source, and tending towards truth
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Ch. 5
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p.49
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10334
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Testimony is an area in which epistemology meets ethics
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Ch. 5
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p.49
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10333
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Communitarianism in epistemology sees the community as the primary knower
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Ch. 5
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p.50
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10335
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Myths about lonely genius are based on epistemological individualism
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Ch. 5
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p.52
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10336
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Powerless people are assumed to be unreliable, even about their own lives
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Ch. 5
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p.55
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10337
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We can have knowledge without belief, if others credit us with knowledge
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Ch. 8
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p.94
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10338
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The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs
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Ch. 8
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p.99
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10340
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Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment
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Ch. 8
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p.99
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10339
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Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time
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Ch. 8
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p.100
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10341
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Justification depends on the audience and one's social role
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Ch. 9
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p.107
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10343
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Process reliabilism has been called 'virtue epistemology', resting on perception, memory, reason
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Ch. 9
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p.112
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10344
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Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself?
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Ch.10
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p.121
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10345
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Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity
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Ch.11
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p.148
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10348
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Private justification is justification to imagined other people
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Ch.11
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p.152
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10349
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To be considered 'an individual' is performed by a society
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Ch.11
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p.161
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10350
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Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed
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Ch.11
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p.163
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10351
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Natural kinds are social institutions
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Ch.16
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p.229
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10353
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Tarskians distinguish truth from falsehood by relations between members of sets
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Ch.17
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p.233
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10354
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Correspondence could be with other beliefs, rather than external facts
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Ch.19
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p.274
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10357
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Methodological Solipsism assumes all ideas could be derived from one mind
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Ch.19
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p.276
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10358
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Often socialising people is the only way to persuade them
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