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Ideas of Robert Kirk, by Text
[British, fl. 1990, Professor at Nottingham University.]
§2.5
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p.37
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4982
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Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect
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§3.8
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p.60
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4984
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All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics
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§3.8
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p.60
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4985
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If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms
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§3.8
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p.61
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4986
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A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws'
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§4.5
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p.84
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4990
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The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism
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§5.1
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p.100
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4991
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Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones
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§5.2
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p.103
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4992
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In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions
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§5.4
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p.104
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4993
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If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm
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§5.5
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p.106
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4994
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Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships
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§5.5
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p.107
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4995
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Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation
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§7.10
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p.158
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5000
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Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal
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§7.3
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p.142
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4997
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It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them
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§7.6
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p.149
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4998
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Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths
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§7.9
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p.155
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4999
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For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour
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§8.4
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p.167
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5001
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Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two
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