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Ideas of R Keefe / P Smith, by Text
[British, fl. 1997, both of Cambridge University.]
1997
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Intro: Theories of Vagueness
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§1
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p.2
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9044
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If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question
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§1
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p.2
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9045
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Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change
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§1
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p.5
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9047
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Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement
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§1
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p.6
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9048
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The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics
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§1
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p.7
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9049
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Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise
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§1
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p.7
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9050
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A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1
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§1
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p.15
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9053
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If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness
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§2
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p.19
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9055
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The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary
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§3
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p.23
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9056
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Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail
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§3
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p.30
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9058
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Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism
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§3
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p.32
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9059
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The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical
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§3
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p.33
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9060
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Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise
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§4
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p.43
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9061
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People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are
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§4
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p.46
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9062
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If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall'
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§4
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p.47
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9063
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How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321?
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§5
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p.51
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9064
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Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature
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§5
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p.55
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9065
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S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P)
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