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Ideas of Jerrold J. Katz, by Text
[American, fl. 1978, Professor at the City University, New York.]
2000
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Realistic Rationalism
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Int.xi
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p.-24
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2510
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Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality
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Int.xx
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p.-15
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2513
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We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic
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Int.xxi
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p.-14
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2516
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Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off
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Int.xxiv
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p.-11
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2517
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Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it
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Int.xxix
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p.-6
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2521
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'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction
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Int.xxvi
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p.-9
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2519
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It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference
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Int.xxvi
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p.-9
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2520
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Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth
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Int.xxvi
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p.-9
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2518
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Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens
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Int.xxxi
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p.-4
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2522
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Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary
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