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Ideas of Immanuel Kant, by Text
[German, 1724 - 1804, Born and died at Königsberg, on the Baltic. Professor at the University there.]
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422:53
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p.85
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19739
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The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory
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1781
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Critique of Pure Reason
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p.
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7416
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Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot]
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p.-8
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9751
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To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Korsgaard]
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p.2
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12767
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Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Fraassen]
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p.3
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9752
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Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Korsgaard]
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p.13
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7918
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Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Macdonald,C]
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p.13
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8451
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Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Orenstein]
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p.15
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23461
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Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Morris,M]
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p.17
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7070
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Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Critchley]
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p.18
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22052
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Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie]
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p.19
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20943
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Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Bowie]
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p.19
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9156
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Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge]
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p.20
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18262
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For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa]
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p.22
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14710
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Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Schroeter]
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p.23
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2869
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Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche]
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p.24
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20944
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Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Bowie]
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p.25
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22003
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We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Pinkard]
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p.25
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9755
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The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Korsgaard]
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p.26
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22004
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Concepts are rules for combining representations [Pinkard]
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p.27
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9756
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We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Korsgaard]
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p.28
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6909
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In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Feuerbach]
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p.28
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6910
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Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Feuerbach]
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p.31
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21759
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Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Houlgate]
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p.32
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21440
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For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Gardner]
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p.35
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22005
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Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Pinkard]
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p.35
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6916
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For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Feuerbach]
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p.36
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22006
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The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Pinkard]
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p.36
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6160
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Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands]
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p.38
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19655
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Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Meillassoux]
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p.46
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5402
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Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Russell]
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p.49
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5403
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If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell]
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p.49
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5404
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Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell]
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p.50
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12421
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Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher]
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p.54
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4708
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Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady]
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p.62
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8687
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Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Friend]
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p.63
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3321
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Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA]
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p.65
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9632
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Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Brown,JR]
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p.71
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4086
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Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Crane]
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p.71
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6577
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For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Fogelin]
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p.72
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6578
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For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Fogelin]
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p.77
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8734
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Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro]
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p.78
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8735
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Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Shapiro]
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p.78
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16256
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For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Maudlin]
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p.79
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8736
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Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Shapiro]
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p.88
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8739
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Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Shapiro]
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p.89
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6584
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A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Fogelin]
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p.89
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19669
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For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Meillassoux]
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p.96
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8256
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Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [McDowell]
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p.104
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5203
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We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer]
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p.106
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19672
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Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux]
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p.107
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17772
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Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Bayne]
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p.109
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17709
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We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Mares]
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p.115
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7314
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How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A]
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p.120
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2774
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Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Dancy,J]
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p.131
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3342
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Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Benardete,JA]
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p.133
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3343
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Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA]
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p.157
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15627
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Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Hegel]
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p.171
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13732
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Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
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p.192
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12458
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Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Hilbert]
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p.213
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7575
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A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Jolley]
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p.213
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7576
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The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Jolley]
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p.241
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18236
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Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Korsgaard]
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p.274
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21456
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Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner]
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p.327
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21462
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It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Gardner]
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p.373
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16898
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Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Burge]
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A Pref xi n
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p.100
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21439
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Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination
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B Pref ix
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p.106
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18794
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Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking
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B Pref xvi
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p.110
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21438
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Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects)
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B003
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p.137
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12414
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A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience
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B003
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p.137
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9345
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Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities
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B003-4
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p.367
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16893
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The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Burge]
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B004
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p.137
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9346
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Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition
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B005
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p.138
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9347
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A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience
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B005
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p.138
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5523
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Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association
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B006
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p.138
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9348
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Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori
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B008/A5
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p.140
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9349
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A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted)
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B009/A5
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p.140
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9350
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Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects
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B009/A5
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p.140
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9351
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One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further
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B010/A6
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p.130
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20291
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If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic
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B011/A7
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p.130
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20292
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Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates
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B011/A7
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p.141
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18259
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Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts
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B014
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p.144
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5524
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Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience
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B015
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p.144
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5525
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No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve
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B016
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p.144
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5526
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With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts
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B016
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p.145
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5527
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That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity
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B017
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p.145
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5528
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That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic
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B019
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p.146
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5529
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The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible?
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B021
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p.147
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16611
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You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind
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B023
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p.148
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5530
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Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics
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B025/A11
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p.149
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21442
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'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode
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B034/A20
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p.155
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23454
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Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order
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B038/A23
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p.175
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17736
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We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation
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B038/A24
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p.158
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5531
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Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence
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B045/A29
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p.161
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5532
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Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject
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B045/A30
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p.162
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5533
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Objects in themselves are not known to us at all
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B046/A31
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p.162
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5534
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One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori
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B047/A32
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p.162
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5535
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That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis
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B056/A39
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p.166
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5536
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If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities
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B059/A42
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p.168
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19386
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Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear
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B059/A42
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p.168
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21446
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If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too
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B060/A43
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p.185
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21445
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Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves
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B065/A47
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p.170
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5537
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That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition
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B075/A51
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p.193
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17616
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Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind
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B075/A51
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p.194
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5538
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Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity
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B082/A58
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p.197
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5539
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We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects
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B082/A58
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p.197
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5540
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Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked
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B083/A59
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p.197
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5541
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A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided
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B084/A59
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p.197
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5542
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There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic
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B093/A68
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p.205
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5543
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All human cognition is through concepts
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B103/A78
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p.211
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22443
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We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it
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B106/A80
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p.212
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5544
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Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality
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B124/A91
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p.223
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5545
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Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity
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B125/A93
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p.224
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5546
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Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object?
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B126/A93
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p.224
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5547
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The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible
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B126/A93
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p.224
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21449
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The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience
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B128/A95
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p.226
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21448
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Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced
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B132
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p.246
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21450
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Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it
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B132
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p.247
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5549
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Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness
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B149
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p.256
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5550
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A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate
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B158
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p.260
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5551
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I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself
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B158
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p.260
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23697
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I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination
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B163
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p.263
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5552
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Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances
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B166
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p.264
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5553
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Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible
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B167
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p.265
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5554
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Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws
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B173/A134
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p.269
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5555
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Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility
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B181/A142
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p.274
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5556
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A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image
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B204-6/A164
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p.87
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8737
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Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Shapiro]
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B205/A164
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p.216
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2795
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If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Dancy,J]
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B205/A164
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p.288
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5557
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Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions
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B205/A164
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p.288
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5558
|
7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination
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B218/A176
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p.295
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5559
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Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori
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B219/A177
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p.296
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5560
|
The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity
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B224/A182
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p.299
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21451
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All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change
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B226/A183
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p.300
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5561
|
If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs
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B234/A189
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p.305
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5562
|
Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws
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B246/A201
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p.311
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5563
|
The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time
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B248/A203
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p.312
|
14560
|
A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause
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B250/A205
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p.313
|
5564
|
Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change
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B265/A217
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p.321
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5565
|
Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found
|
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B266/A218
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p.321
|
18796
|
Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary
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B266/A219
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p.322
|
18797
|
Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition
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B275
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p.327
|
21452
|
I can only determine my existence in time via external things
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B282/A230
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p.330
|
5566
|
Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary?
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B298/A239
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p.90
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8740
|
Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition
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B299/A240
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p.341
|
17617
|
Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless
|
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B303/A246
|
p.345
|
5567
|
A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences
|
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B310/A255
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p.362
|
5568
|
We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances
|
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B314/A258
|
p.364
|
5569
|
We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions
|
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B319/A263
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p.368
|
14509
|
If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location
|
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B334/A278
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p.376
|
5570
|
Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance
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B353/A296
|
p.16
|
22274
|
'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Potter]
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B355/A299
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p.387
|
5572
|
Reason has logical and transcendental faculties
|
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B355/A299
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p.387
|
5571
|
Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles
|
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B356/A299
|
p.387
|
5573
|
Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles
|
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B373/A316
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p.397
|
5575
|
An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens
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B375/A319
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p.398
|
5576
|
We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion
|
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B391/A334
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p.406
|
5577
|
Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought
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B392/A335
|
p.406
|
5578
|
Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects
|
|
B406-/A357
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p.420
|
5581
|
We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves
|
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B406-/A364
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p.423
|
5582
|
As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity
|
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B406-/A383
|
p.433
|
5583
|
We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism
|
|
B406-/A388
|
p.435
|
5584
|
All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical
|
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B406-/A390
|
p.436
|
5585
|
Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance
|
|
B406-/A395
|
p.439
|
5586
|
The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches
|
|
B406-/A398-9
|
p.169
|
2965
|
For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Lockwood]
|
|
B420
|
p.452
|
5589
|
Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul
|
|
B422
|
p.453
|
5590
|
'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise)
|
|
B425
|
p.454
|
5591
|
Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose
|
|
B434/A407
|
p.460
|
5592
|
Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason
|
|
B435/A409
|
p.460
|
5593
|
Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding
|
|
B447/A419
|
p.466
|
5594
|
Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances
|
|
B450/A423
|
p.468
|
21454
|
The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender
|
|
B452/A424
|
p.469
|
5595
|
Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions
|
|
B474/A446
|
p.484
|
5596
|
We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself
|
|
B478/A450
|
p.486
|
5597
|
If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing
|
|
B484/A456
|
p.492
|
5598
|
If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end
|
|
B496/A468
|
p.499
|
5599
|
Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty
|
|
B502/A474
|
p.502
|
5600
|
Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system
|
|
B519/A491
|
p.511
|
21956
|
Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism)
|
|
B521/A493
|
p.512
|
5601
|
There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences
|
|
B535/A507
|
p.519
|
5602
|
The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method
|
|
B575/A547
|
p.540
|
21455
|
We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature
|
|
B579/A551
|
p.542
|
5603
|
Pure reason exists outside of time
|
|
B582/A554
|
p.543
|
5604
|
In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary
|
|
B583/A555
|
p.544
|
5605
|
Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed
|
|
B585/A557
|
p.545
|
5606
|
Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions
|
|
B619/A591
|
p.563
|
5607
|
Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori)
|
|
B624/A596 n
|
p.566
|
18795
|
A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible)
|
|
B625/A597
|
p.566
|
5609
|
If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence
|
|
B625/A597
|
p.566
|
5608
|
Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic?
|
|
B626/A598
|
p.566
|
5610
|
If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction
|
|
B626/A598
|
p.567
|
5611
|
Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept
|
|
B627/A599
|
p.567
|
5612
|
You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist
|
|
B628/A600
|
p.567
|
4475
|
Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept
|
|
B630/A602
|
p.568
|
5613
|
The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction
|
|
B646/A618
|
p.576
|
5615
|
Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter
|
|
B708/A680
|
p.610
|
5616
|
Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects
|
|
B730/A702
|
p.622
|
5617
|
Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas
|
|
B741/A713
|
p.380
|
16899
|
Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Burge]
|
|
B743/A715
|
p.631
|
18264
|
We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour
|
|
B755/A727
|
p.637
|
5618
|
Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries
|
|
B756/A728
|
p.638
|
5619
|
No a priori concept can be defined
|
|
B760/A732
|
p.640
|
5620
|
Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts
|
|
B766/A738
|
p.643
|
5621
|
The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas
|
|
B786/A758
|
p.653
|
5622
|
The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori
|
|
B787/A757
|
p.653
|
5623
|
If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part
|
|
B790/A762
|
p.655
|
5624
|
We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience
|
|
B795/A767
|
p.657
|
5626
|
An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience
|
|
B80/A56
|
p.196
|
23696
|
Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible
|
|
B812/A784
|
p.666
|
5627
|
I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance
|
|
B814/A786
|
p.667
|
5628
|
Reason hates to be limited in its speculations
|
|
B819/A791
|
p.669
|
5629
|
If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false
|
|
B827/A799
|
p.674
|
5630
|
Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative
|
|
B833/A805
|
p.677
|
5631
|
Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes
|
|
B839/A811
|
p.680
|
5632
|
Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide
|
|
B847/A819
|
p.684
|
5633
|
We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties
|
|
B850/A822
|
p.686
|
5634
|
Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both
|
|
B859/A831
|
p.690
|
5635
|
In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding
|
|
B868/A840
|
p.695
|
21457
|
Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite
|
|
B869/A841
|
p.969
|
21954
|
Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori
|
|
1781
|
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic
|
|
266
|
p.16
|
16926
|
Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject
|
|
267
|
p.17
|
16927
|
Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject
|
|
268
|
p.18
|
16928
|
Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori
|
|
269
|
p.19
|
16929
|
7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12
|
|
269
|
p.20
|
16930
|
Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality
|
|
274
|
p.24
|
16931
|
Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic
|
|
281
|
p.36
|
16910
|
Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure
|
|
282
|
p.37
|
16912
|
Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause
|
|
282
|
p.37
|
16911
|
Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object
|
|
282
|
p.38
|
16913
|
I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations
|
|
283
|
p.38
|
16916
|
A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves
|
|
283
|
p.38
|
16914
|
A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility
|
|
283
|
p.38
|
16915
|
A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses
|
|
284
|
p.39
|
16917
|
All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time
|
|
284
|
p.39
|
16919
|
Geometry rests on our intuition of space
|
|
284
|
p.39
|
16918
|
Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts
|
|
284
|
p.39
|
16920
|
Numbers are formed by addition of units in time
|
|
284
|
p.39
|
16921
|
If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left
|
|
285
|
p.40
|
16922
|
Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles
|
|
289 n.II
|
p.45
|
16923
|
I admit there are bodies outside us
|
|
289 n.II
|
p.46
|
16924
|
I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances
|
|
290
|
p.46
|
21447
|
I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object
|
|
292 n.III
|
p.50
|
16925
|
Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience
|
|
333
|
p.97
|
11833
|
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us
|
|
373 n
|
p.144
|
21441
|
'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience
|
|
4:260
|
p.109
|
21955
|
My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume
|
|
4:293
|
p.121
|
21957
|
'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know
|
|
1784
|
Answer to 'What is Enlightenment?'
|
|
p.55
|
p.55
|
21058
|
Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm
|
|
1784
|
Idea for a Universal History
|
|
Intro
|
p.41
|
21053
|
The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature
|
|
2nd
|
p.42
|
21054
|
Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions
|
|
5th
|
p.45
|
21055
|
Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint
|
|
8th
|
p.50
|
21056
|
The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others)
|
|
8th
|
p.51
|
21057
|
The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence
|
|
1785
|
Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals
|
|
|
p.-10
|
9749
|
Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Korsgaard]
|
|
|
p.-9
|
9750
|
We must only value what others find acceptable [Korsgaard]
|
|
|
p.16
|
22050
|
The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Bowie]
|
|
|
p.28
|
7105
|
If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Statman]
|
|
|
p.43
|
8046
|
We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [MacIntyre]
|
|
|
p.51
|
5074
|
Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R]
|
|
|
p.52
|
3544
|
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Annas]
|
|
|
p.65
|
4413
|
The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche]
|
|
|
p.71
|
7670
|
Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Berlin]
|
|
|
p.72
|
7671
|
Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Berlin]
|
|
|
p.74
|
7673
|
Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Berlin]
|
|
|
p.75
|
7674
|
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Berlin]
|
|
|
p.83
|
15673
|
The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Finlayson]
|
|
|
p.97
|
5295
|
Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Marx/Engels]
|
|
|
p.99
|
5296
|
Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Marx/Engels]
|
|
|
p.101
|
4345
|
For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Hursthouse]
|
|
|
p.107
|
20160
|
Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes]
|
|
|
p.114
|
6694
|
Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only
|
|
|
p.123
|
6695
|
Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Graham]
|
|
|
p.123
|
21029
|
Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Sandel]
|
|
|
p.165
|
22390
|
Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot]
|
|
|
p.174
|
7625
|
We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam]
|
|
|
p.175
|
20714
|
God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Davies,B]
|
|
|
p.176
|
8068
|
Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe]
|
|
|
p.184
|
4251
|
If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B]
|
|
|
p.188
|
16004
|
If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard]
|
|
|
p.197
|
8025
|
The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre]
|
|
|
p.197
|
8026
|
Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre]
|
|
|
p.197
|
8024
|
The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre]
|
|
|
p.198
|
8028
|
Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre]
|
|
|
p.198
|
8027
|
I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre]
|
|
|
p.226
|
24011
|
Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Williams,B]
|
|
|
p.246
|
7591
|
Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton]
|
|
|
p.254
|
3762
|
Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill]
|
|
|
p.363
|
4024
|
Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C]
|
|
393.1
|
p.59
|
3710
|
The only purely good thing is a good will
|
|
393.2
|
p.59
|
3711
|
Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness
|
|
394.3
|
p.60
|
3712
|
A good will is not good because of what it achieves
|
|
396.7
|
p.62
|
3713
|
The function of reason is to produce a good will
|
|
399.13
|
p.65
|
3714
|
Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed
|
|
401.15
|
p.66
|
3715
|
Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings
|
|
401.16 n
|
p.67
|
3717
|
Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love
|
|
402.17
|
p.67
|
3716
|
Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law
|
|
402.18
|
p.68
|
3718
|
Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience
|
|
403.19
|
p.68
|
3719
|
If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible
|
|
407.26
|
p.72
|
3720
|
We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses
|
|
408.29
|
p.73
|
3721
|
We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection
|
|
412.36
|
p.76
|
3722
|
Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples
|
|
414.39
|
p.78
|
3723
|
There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law
|
|
414.39
|
p.78
|
3724
|
A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake
|
|
416.43
|
p.80
|
3725
|
The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences
|
|
420.50
|
p.83
|
3726
|
The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition
|
|
421.52
|
p.84
|
3727
|
Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature
|
|
422.53
|
p.85
|
3728
|
Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [PG]
|
|
428.65
|
p.90
|
3729
|
Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them
|
|
428.65
|
p.91
|
3730
|
Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends
|
|
429.66
|
p.91
|
3731
|
Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself
|
|
430.68
|
p.92
|
3732
|
Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means
|
|
430.68 n
|
p.92
|
3733
|
The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties
|
|
432.73
|
p.94
|
3735
|
Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal
|
|
435.79
|
p.97
|
3736
|
Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends
|
|
437.81
|
p.98
|
3737
|
The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself
|
|
437.82
|
p.99
|
3738
|
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end
|
|
446.97
|
p.107
|
3739
|
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes
|
|
448.101
|
p.109
|
3740
|
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled
|
|
456.115
|
p.116
|
3741
|
We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible
|
|
AA429 p.96
|
p.53
|
22008
|
Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means
|
|
AA434 p.102
|
p.54
|
22009
|
Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends
|
|
p.19
|
p.184
|
20715
|
It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty
|
|
p.66
|
p.66
|
4344
|
Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth
|
|
1786
|
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science
|
|
534
|
p.93
|
15308
|
Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them
|
|
1788
|
Critique of Practical Reason
|
|
|
p.30
|
18675
|
Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi]
|
|
|
p.53
|
22007
|
An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Pinkard]
|
|
|
p.240
|
18234
|
The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Korsgaard]
|
|
|
p.240
|
18235
|
Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Korsgaard]
|
|
Intro
|
p.15
|
6183
|
Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant?
|
|
Pref
|
p.12
|
6181
|
Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition
|
|
Concl
|
p.169
|
6207
|
What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me
|
|
I.1.1.§3
|
p.23
|
6184
|
Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher
|
|
I.1.1.§4
|
p.27
|
6185
|
No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death
|
|
I.1.1.§7
|
p.32
|
6186
|
A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law
|
|
I.1.1.§8
|
p.35
|
6187
|
Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism
|
|
I.1.1.I
|
p.45
|
6188
|
A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide
|
|
I.1.II
|
p.60
|
6190
|
The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil
|
|
I.1.II
|
p.61
|
6191
|
The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles
|
|
I.1.II
|
p.63
|
6192
|
Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil
|
|
I.1.II
|
p.64
|
6193
|
Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence
|
|
I.1.II
|
p.74
|
6194
|
The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions
|
|
I.1.III
|
p.75
|
6195
|
Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will
|
|
I.1.III
|
p.79
|
6196
|
People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous
|
|
I.1.III
|
p.85
|
6197
|
Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome
|
|
I.II.II
|
p.116
|
6198
|
Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.131
|
1452
|
Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.131
|
1453
|
We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.132
|
6199
|
Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.135
|
1456
|
Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.136
|
1454
|
Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.137
|
6200
|
Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.138
|
6201
|
Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means
|
|
I.II.II.V
|
p.139
|
1455
|
Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [PG]
|
|
I.II.II.VI
|
p.145
|
6204
|
Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you
|
|
I.II.II.VI
|
p.145
|
6202
|
In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left
|
|
I.II.II.VI
|
p.145
|
6203
|
Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics
|
|
I.II.II.VI
|
p.146
|
6206
|
From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones
|
|
I.II.II.VI
|
p.146
|
6205
|
To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds
|
|
1790
|
Critique of Judgement I: Aesthetic
|
|
|
p.3
|
12157
|
Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Scruton]
|
|
|
p.27
|
18547
|
Only rational beings can experience beauty [Scruton]
|
|
|
p.146
|
20346
|
The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Wollheim]
|
|
|
p.160
|
5643
|
Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Scruton]
|
|
|
p.209
|
22711
|
The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Murdoch]
|
|
|
p.339
|
22046
|
The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Pinkard]
|
|
|
p.423
|
4025
|
Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Taylor,C]
|
|
28-9
|
p.326
|
21458
|
The sublime is a moral experience [Gardner]
|
|
CUP 1 5:203
|
p.64
|
20410
|
The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings
|
|
CUP 2 5:204
|
p.67
|
20412
|
Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake
|
|
CUP 7 5:212
|
p.63
|
20408
|
With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter
|
|
CUP 7 5:213
|
p.63
|
20409
|
When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody
|
|
CUP 7 5:213
|
p.65
|
20411
|
Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste
|
|
1790
|
Critique of Judgement II: Teleological
|
|
|
p.19
|
22053
|
The Critique of Judgement aims for a principle that unities humanity and nature [Bowie]
|
|
|
p.244
|
18239
|
What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Korsgaard]
|
|
C3 442
|
p.242
|
18237
|
Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose
|
|
C3 443
|
p.243
|
18238
|
Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose
|
|
1792
|
True in Theory, but not in Practice
|
|
Intro
|
p.61
|
21059
|
General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them
|
|
Intro
|
p.62
|
21060
|
It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible
|
|
1B
|
p.65
|
21061
|
Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will
|
|
1Bb
|
p.68
|
21062
|
The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law
|
|
2 Intro
|
p.73
|
21063
|
Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share
|
|
2 Intro
|
p.74
|
21064
|
A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members
|
|
2-2
|
p.75
|
21066
|
Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve
|
|
2-2
|
p.75
|
21065
|
You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts!
|
|
2-3
|
p.78
|
21067
|
A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill
|
|
2-3
|
p.79
|
21068
|
There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions
|
|
2-Concl
|
p.79
|
21069
|
A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept
|
|
2-Concl
|
p.79
|
21070
|
A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it
|
|
2-Concl
|
p.86
|
21071
|
There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights
|
|
3
|
p.90
|
21072
|
The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war
|
|
|
p.73
|
20569
|
Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Oksala]
|
|
1.3
|
p.9
|
21073
|
Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights
|
|
1.6
|
p.96
|
21074
|
Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible
|
|
2
|
p.98
|
21075
|
The state of nature always involves the threat of war
|
|
2.1st n
|
p.99
|
21076
|
Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure
|
|
2.2nd
|
p.102
|
21077
|
Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution
|
|
App 1
|
p.118
|
21078
|
A constitution must always be improved when necessary
|
|
App 1
|
p.123
|
21079
|
The a priori general will of a people shows what is right
|
|
'Third'
|
p.107
|
20570
|
There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere
|
|
'Third'
|
p.108
|
20571
|
There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights
|
|
p.16
|
p.16
|
22275
|
Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think
|
|
p.455
|
p.11
|
18261
|
A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition
|
|
p.843
|
p.12
|
18260
|
If we knew what we know, we would be astonished
|
|
1797
|
Metaphysics of Morals I: Doctrine of Right
|
|
Div B
|
p.63
|
21407
|
Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others
|
|
Intro C
|
p.133
|
21080
|
Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms
|
|
Intro E
|
p.135
|
21081
|
We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right
|
|
Pref
|
p.36
|
21406
|
Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles
|
|
§44
|
p.137
|
21082
|
A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges
|
|
§46
|
p.139
|
21083
|
Women have no role in politics
|
|
§47
|
p.140
|
21084
|
In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth
|
|
§49 Gen C
|
p.150
|
21085
|
The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people
|
|
§49 Gen D
|
p.152
|
21086
|
Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned
|
|
§49 Gen E
|
p.155
|
21087
|
Human life is pointless without justice
|
|
§49 Gen E
|
p.157
|
21088
|
Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws
|
|
§51
|
p.161
|
21089
|
Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power
|
|
§55
|
p.166
|
21090
|
If someone has largely made something, then they own it
|
|
1797
|
Metaphysics of Morals II:Doctrine of Virtue
|
|
375 Pref
|
p.181
|
21408
|
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics
|
|
376 Pref
|
p.182
|
21409
|
Moral principles do not involve feelings
|
|
382 Intro I
|
p.187
|
21410
|
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible
|
|
383 Intro II
|
p.188
|
21411
|
A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end
|
|
392 Intro VIII
|
p.195
|
21412
|
Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end
|
|
394 Intro IX
|
p.197
|
21413
|
Virtue is strong maxims for duty
|
|
395 Intro IX
|
p.198
|
21414
|
The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends
|
|
399 Intro XII
|
p.200
|
21415
|
Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect
|
|
403 Intro XIII
|
p.204
|
21416
|
Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them
|
|
404n Intro XIII
|
p.205
|
21417
|
How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims
|
|
406 Intro XIII
|
p.207
|
21418
|
There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects
|
|
409 Intro XVI
|
p.210
|
21419
|
If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims
|
|
432 I.I
|
p.228
|
21420
|
If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice
|
|
434 I.I
|
p.230
|
21421
|
Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price
|
|
441 I.I
|
p.236
|
21422
|
Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom
|
|
442 I.I
|
p.237
|
21423
|
Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons
|
|
443 I.I
|
p.238
|
21424
|
Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans
|
|
448 I.II
|
p.243
|
21425
|
We can love without respect, and show respect without love
|
|
449 I.II
|
p.244
|
21430
|
Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends
|
|
449 I.II
|
p.244
|
21427
|
Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons
|
|
449 I.II
|
p.244
|
21426
|
Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance
|
|
449 I.II
|
p.244
|
21428
|
Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right
|
|
449 I.II
|
p.244
|
21429
|
The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own
|
|
458 I.II
|
p.251
|
21431
|
The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole
|
|
460-1 I.II
|
p.253
|
21433
|
Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution
|
|
463 I.II
|
p.255
|
21434
|
We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal
|
|
471 I.II
|
p.263
|
21435
|
Man is both social, and unsociable
|
|
473-4 I.II App
|
p.265
|
21436
|
We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable
|
|
488 II
|
p.276
|
21437
|
All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights
|
|
1797
|
On a supposed right to lie
|
|
p.29
|
p.29
|
22441
|
The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder
|
|
p.30
|
p.30
|
22442
|
If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract
|
|
21:78, p.245
|
p.161
|
21971
|
Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality
|