green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of Peter van Inwagen, by Text
[American, fl. 1983, Professor at Syracuse University, then professor at University of Notre Dame.]
1983
|
An Essay on Free Will
|
|
p.44
|
6981
|
Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Jackson]
|
Pref
|
p.5
|
17531
|
I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples'
|
01
|
p.17
|
17556
|
Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff
|
01
|
p.17
|
17559
|
Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required?
|
02
|
p.21
|
17557
|
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something?
|
02
|
p.25
|
17558
|
Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters
|
03
|
p.35
|
17560
|
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object?
|
04
|
p.39
|
17561
|
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things
|
05
|
p.53
|
17562
|
The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump
|
07
|
p.67
|
17563
|
The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together
|
07
|
p.68
|
17564
|
The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse
|
08
|
p.72
|
17565
|
Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible
|
09
|
p.81
|
17566
|
I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship
|
09
|
p.87
|
17567
|
A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated
|
09
|
p.88
|
17568
|
A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism
|
09
|
p.89
|
17569
|
Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap
|
09
|
p.95
|
17570
|
The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements
|
10
|
p.98
|
17571
|
Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple
|
10
|
p.182
|
14228
|
If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins]
|
11
|
p.109
|
14227
|
We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise'
|
12
|
p.120
|
17572
|
Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible
|
12
|
p.121
|
17573
|
There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing
|
12
|
p.122
|
14468
|
Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them
|
13
|
p.126
|
17574
|
If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations
|
13
|
p.134
|
17575
|
The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings
|
13
|
p.140
|
17576
|
If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me
|
14
|
p.159
|
17577
|
When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron?
|
14
|
p.160
|
17578
|
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles
|
14
|
p.167
|
17579
|
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations
|
15
|
p.181
|
17580
|
One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body
|
17
|
p.217
|
17581
|
Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague
|
17
|
p.219
|
17582
|
Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague
|
18
|
p.229
|
17583
|
There are no heaps
|
18
|
p.237
|
17584
|
Some events are only borderline cases of lives
|
18
|
p.238
|
17585
|
Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague?
|
18
|
p.239
|
17586
|
At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction
|
18
|
p.262
|
17587
|
The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false
|
18
|
p.263
|
17588
|
We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity'
|
18
|
p.266
|
17589
|
If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem
|
19
|
p.274
|
17590
|
A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion
|
19
|
p.281
|
17591
|
Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities
|
7
|
p.190
|
14230
|
We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Liggins]
|
Ch.13
|
p.39
|
8264
|
Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Lowe]
|
p.72-
|
p.18
|
10662
|
Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Varzi]
|
|
p.21
|
7101
|
Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Statman]
|
2003
|
Existence,Ontological Commitment and Fictions
|
p.154
|
p.154
|
8972
|
What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}?
|