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Ideas of Edmund Husserl, by Text
[German, 1859 - 1938, Born at Prossnitz. Pupil of Brentano. Professor at the University of Freiburg.]
1894
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Philosophy of Arithmetic
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p.16
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21214
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We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Velarde-Mayol]
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p.20
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9819
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Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett]
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p.146
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9851
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Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett]
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p.193
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17444
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Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Heck]
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p.144
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p.95
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9837
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0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Dummett]
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p.73-74
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p.322
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9575
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Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Frege]
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p.85
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p.323
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9576
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Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc.
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p.137
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3348
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If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA]
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1900
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Logical Investigations
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p.14
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15570
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Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Polt]
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p.28
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7614
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Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Putnam]
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p.421
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6893
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Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Mautner]
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II.VI.24
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p.36
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21216
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Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Velarde-Mayol]
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1913
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Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology
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p.198
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22216
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Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Bernet]
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p.199
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22218
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There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Bernet]
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p.199
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22217
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Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Bernet]
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p.200
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22219
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Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Bernet]
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p.203
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22220
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The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Bernet]
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p.203
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22221
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We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Bernet]
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p.820
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19263
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Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Vaidya]
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Intro
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p.6
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22201
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The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful
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I.1.001
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p.10
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22202
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The World is all experiencable objects
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I.1.002
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p.44
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21218
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The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos
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I.1.008
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p.19
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22203
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Only facts follow from facts
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I.2.019
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p.57
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21221
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Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation
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I.2.020
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p.38
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22204
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Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given
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I.2.021
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p.39
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22205
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Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory
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I.2.026
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p.45
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22206
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Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism
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II.1.031
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p.58
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22207
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Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain
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II.1.032
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p.59
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22208
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'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence
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II.2.033
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p.61
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22209
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Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being
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II.2.033
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p.62
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22210
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After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own
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II.2.042
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p.78
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22211
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As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge
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II.2.046
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p.57
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21220
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The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing
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II.3.049
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p.95
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22212
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Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being
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II.3.055
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p.108
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22213
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Absolute reality is an absurdity
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II.4.057
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p.111
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22214
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We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience
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II.4.059
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p.115
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22215
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Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences
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III.1.063
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p.41
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21217
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Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions
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1929
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Formal and Transcendental Logic
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p.67
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21222
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Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Velarde-Mayol]
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p.69
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21224
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Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Velarde-Mayol]
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p.183
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p.68
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21223
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Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Velarde-Mayol]
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1931
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Cartesian Meditations
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p.70
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21225
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The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Velarde-Mayol]
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p.72
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21226
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Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Velarde-Mayol]
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p.79
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21228
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Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Velarde-Mayol]
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