green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Edmund Husserl, by Text

[German, 1859 - 1938, Born at Prossnitz. Pupil of Brentano. Professor at the University of Freiburg.]

1894 Philosophy of Arithmetic
p.16 We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Velarde-Mayol]
p.20 Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett]
p.146 Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett]
p.193 Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Heck]
p.144 p.95 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Dummett]
p.73-74 p.322 Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Frege]
p.85 p.323 Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc.
1898 works
p.137 If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA]
1900 Logical Investigations
p.14 Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Polt]
p.28 Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Putnam]
p.421 Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Mautner]
II.VI.24 p.36 Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Velarde-Mayol]
1913 Ideas: intro to pure phenomenology
p.198 Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Bernet]
p.199 There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Bernet]
p.199 Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Bernet]
p.200 Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Bernet]
p.203 The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Bernet]
p.203 We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Bernet]
p.820 Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Vaidya]
Intro p.6 The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful
I.1.001 p.10 The World is all experiencable objects
I.1.002 p.44 The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos
I.1.008 p.19 Only facts follow from facts
I.2.019 p.57 Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation
I.2.020 p.38 Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given
I.2.021 p.39 Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory
I.2.026 p.45 Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism
II.1.031 p.58 Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain
II.1.032 p.59 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence
II.2.033 p.61 Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being
II.2.033 p.62 After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own
II.2.042 p.78 As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge
II.2.046 p.57 The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing
II.3.049 p.95 Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being
II.3.055 p.108 Absolute reality is an absurdity
II.4.057 p.111 We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience
II.4.059 p.115 Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences
III.1.063 p.41 Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions
1929 Formal and Transcendental Logic
p.67 Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Velarde-Mayol]
p.69 Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Velarde-Mayol]
p.183 p.68 Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Velarde-Mayol]
1931 Cartesian Meditations
p.70 The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Velarde-Mayol]
p.72 Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Velarde-Mayol]
p.79 Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Velarde-Mayol]