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Ideas of John Hawthorne, by Text
[British, b.1964, Degree at Manchester. Professor at Rutgers University, then Waynflete Professor at Oxford University.]
2001
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Causal Structuralism
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Intro
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p.212
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15123
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Is the causal profile of a property its essence?
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Intro
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p.212
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15122
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Could two different properties have the same causal profile?
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Intro
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p.212
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15121
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An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing
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1.3
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p.215
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15124
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If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power
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1.5
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p.219
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15126
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Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns
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2.4
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p.223
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15127
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A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own
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2.5
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p.223
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15128
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We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world
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Ch.25
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p.264
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15125
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We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else
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3.1
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p.112
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8970
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Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity
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2005
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The Case for Closure
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Intro
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p.41
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19551
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How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'?
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1
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p.42
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19552
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We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks
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2
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p.44
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19553
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Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted
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2
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p.45
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19554
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Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases
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2008
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Three-Dimensionalism v Four-Dimensionalism
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1
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p.264
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14588
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Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions
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1.2
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p.266
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14589
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A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all?
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2.1
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p.270
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14590
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If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way?
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2.2
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p.273
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14591
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Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones
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