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Ideas of B Hale / C Wright, by Text
[British, fl. 1995, two professors based in Scotland.]
2001
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Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study'
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§1
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p.1
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10622
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The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers
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§2 n5
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p.4
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10624
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The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized
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3.1
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p.8
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10626
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Objects just are what singular terms refer to
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3.2
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p.12
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10627
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Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions
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3.2
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p.17
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10630
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Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities
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3.2
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p.18
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10631
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If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological
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3.2 n26
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p.15
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10629
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If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity
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3.2 n26
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p.15
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10628
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The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts
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2007
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Logicism in the 21st Century
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1
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p.167
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8786
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One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines
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1
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p.169
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8784
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Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic
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1 n2
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p.167
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8783
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Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach
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3
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p.179
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8787
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The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number'
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8
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p.196
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8788
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Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology
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2009
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The Metaontology of Abstraction
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§3
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p.182
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12223
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It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure
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§4
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p.184
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12224
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Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist?
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§4 n19
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p.186
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12225
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Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment
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§5
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p.187
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12226
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The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence
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§5
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p.188
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12227
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Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions
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§8
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p.195
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12228
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Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp
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§9
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p.197
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18443
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A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses
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§9
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p.198
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12229
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Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology
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§9
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p.207
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12230
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Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true
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§9
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p.208
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12231
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Reference needs truth as well as sense
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