| 1947 | The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals |
| p.151 | 12191 | Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [McFetridge] |
| 1951 | The Structure of Appearance |
| p.27 | 9920 | Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Burgess/Rosen] |
| p.230 | 7956 | If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Macdonald,C] |
| p.231 | 7957 | Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Macdonald,C] |
| Ch.6 | p.227 | 7952 | If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Macdonald,C] |
| II.2 | p.34 | 15510 | Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities |
| p.26 | p.9 | 10657 | The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different |
| 1954 | Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) |
| p.19 | 18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| p.214 | 17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Putnam] |
| II.3 | p.40 | 14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice |
| p.21 | p.142 | 4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them |
| p.64 | p.64 | 12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result |
| 1968 | Languages of Art (2nd edn) |
| p.178 | 20439 | Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Giovannelli] |
| p.186 | p.174 | 20438 | A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error |
| p.212 | p.173 | 20437 | A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation |
| p.22-255 | p.178 | 20440 | Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms |
| 1976 | The Languages of Art |
| p.603 | 8113 | Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Gardner] |
| 1978 | Ways of Worldmaking |
| 1.2 | p.2 | 17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one |
| 1.2 | p.3 | 17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another |
| 1.3 | p.6 | 17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world |
| 1.4a | p.8 | 17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness |
| 1.4a | p.9 | 17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it |
| 1.4b | p.11 | 17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely |
| 1.4c | p.12 | 17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system |
| 1.4d | p.15 | 17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit |
| 1.4d | p.15 | 17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps |
| 1.5 | p.19 | 17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved |
| 1.6 | p.20 | 17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit |
| 1.7 | p.21 | 17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle |
| 1.7 | p.22 | 17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them |