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Ideas of Jonathan Glover, by Text

[British, b.1941, At Oxford University, then London University. Chairman of various government committees.]

1977 Causing Death and Saving Lives
§3.3 p.43 4648 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function
§3.7 p.53 4649 If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him
§3.9 p.55 4650 The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length
§4.4 p.71 4651 Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents)
§4.4 p.72 4652 If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong
§5.3 p.78 4654 Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people
§5.3 p.79 4655 If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all
§5.6 p.84 4656 A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right
§6 p.86 4657 Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences
§7 p.92 4658 Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act
§7.4 p.98 4659 It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on
§7.8 p.104 4660 Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided
§8.1 p.113 4661 What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain
§9 p.119 4662 Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages
§9 p.120 4663 If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so)
§9.2 p.122 4664 If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too
§9.3 p.123 4665 Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks
§9.3 p.125 4667 How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs?
§9.3 p.125 4666 If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people
§9.4 p.127 4668 You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life
§9.4 p.127 4669 Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware
§11.1 p.138 4670 Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life'
§11.1 p.139 4671 What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted?
§11.1 p.140 4672 Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance
§11.4 p.144 4674 It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother
§11.4 p.144 4673 Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects
§11.7 p.149 4675 The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population
§12.2 p.155 4676 The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths
§13.2 p.174 4679 One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious
§13.5 p.181 4680 Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person
§14.2 p.186 4681 The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme
§15.1 p.191 4682 Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible)
§15.1 p.191 4683 Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects
§15.6 p.197 4684 Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying
§16.3 p.210 4685 Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents
1990 Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics
Pt Five p.152 3784 Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences
Pt Five p.152 3785 You can't separate acts from the people performing them
Pt Five p.154 3786 Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting
Pt Four p.121 3783 How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size?
Pt Six p.196 3787 Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian
Pt Two p.38 3782 Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [PG]