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Ideas of Allan Gibbard, by Text
[American, b.1942, At the University of Michigan.]
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Intro
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p.187
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14064
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If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent
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I
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p.188
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14065
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Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times
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I
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p.189
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14066
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A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay
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I
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p.190
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14067
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Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about
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III
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p.194
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14069
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We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay'
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III
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p.195
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14070
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A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it
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III
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p.198
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14071
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Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria
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IV
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p.198
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14072
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Possible worlds identity needs a sortal
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V
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p.200
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14073
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Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law
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V
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p.201
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14074
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Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations
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VII
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p.207
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14076
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Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition
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VII
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p.207
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14077
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Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts
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VII
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p.208
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14078
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Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds
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X
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p.212
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14079
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Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential
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