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Ideas of Peter Geach, by Text
[British, 1916 - 2013, Married to Elizabeth Anscombe. University of Leeds.]
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p.2
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22489
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'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Foot]
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1957
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Mental Acts: their content and their objects
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§3
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p.6
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2567
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You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens
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§4
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p.8
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2568
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Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours
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§5
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p.13
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8769
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If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts
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§6
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p.18
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8770
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'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group
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§7
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p.23
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8771
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'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience
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§8
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p.28
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8772
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We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted
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§8
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p.30
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8773
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Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects
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§8
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p.31
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8774
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The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages
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§9
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p.32
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8775
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A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction
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§9
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p.33
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8776
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We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too
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§10
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p.35
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8778
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Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently
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§10
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p.36
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8777
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If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted?
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§10
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p.37
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8779
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We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience
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§11
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p.39
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8780
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Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2'
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§11
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p.40
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8781
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The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them
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§16
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p.69
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11910
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Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X'
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1980
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Reference and Generality (3rd ed)
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p.16
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16073
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Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Wasserman]
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p.17
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16075
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Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman]
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p.93
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12154
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Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Perry]
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p.111
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8969
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We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Hawthorne]
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p.39
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p.90
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12152
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Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as'
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1983
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Abstraction Reconsidered
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p.163
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p.163
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10731
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For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world
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p.164
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p.164
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10732
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If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible
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p.167
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p.167
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10733
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The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not'
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p.168
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p.168
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10734
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Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck'
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p.170
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p.170
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10735
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Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times'
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