2005 | Non-foundationalist epistemology |
p.157 | p.157 | 8616 | How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? |
Full Idea: How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? How can their relation to other less than tenable enhance their tenability? | |||
From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.157) | |||
A reaction: Her example is witnesses to a crime. Bayes Theorem appears to deal with individual items. "The thief had green hair" becomes more likely with multiple testimony. This is a very persuasive first step towards justification as coherence. |
p.158 | p.158 | 8617 | Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true |
Full Idea: The best explanation of coherence (where the components of a coherent account must be mutually consistent, cotenable and supportive) is that the account is at least roughly true. | |||
From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.158) | |||
A reaction: Note that she is NOT employing a coherence account of truth (which I take to be utterly wrong). It is notoriously difficult to define coherence. If the components must be 'tenable', they have epistemic status apart from their role in coherence. |
p.160 | p.160 | 8618 | Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) |
Full Idea: The best explanation of the coherence of 'Middlemarch' lies in the novelist's craft. Coherence conduces to epistemic acceptability only when the best explanation of the coherence of a constellation of claims is that they are (at least roughly) true. | |||
From: Catherine Z. Elgin (Non-foundationalist epistemology [2005], p.160) | |||
A reaction: Yes. This combines my favourite inference to the best explanation (the favourite tool of us realists) with coherence as justification, where coherence can, crucially, have a social dimension. I begin to think this is the correct account of justification. |