| 1985 | Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility |
| p.139 | 12185 | Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [McFetridge] |
| 1986 | Do Conditionals Have Truth Conditions? |
| 1 | p.28 | 13853 | It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is |
| 1 | p.29 | 13854 | Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition |
| 1 | p.31 | 13855 | A conditional does not have truth conditions |
| 3 | p.36 | 13857 | Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake |
| 5 | p.38 | 13859 | X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B |
| 2001 | Conditionals |
| 17.1 | p.386 | 13764 | Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? |
| 17.1 | p.387 | 13765 | 'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens |
| 17.2.1 | p.402 | 13768 | Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter |
| 17.3.4 | p.408 | 13770 | There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts |
| 2004 | Two Kinds of Possibility |
| §I | p.1 | 12206 | Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion |
| §I | p.1 | 12207 | Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature |
| §V | p.10 | 12208 | An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary |
| Abs | p.1 | 12205 | There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength |
| 2006 | Conditionals (Stanf) |
| 1 | p.2 | 14270 | Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind |
| 1 | p.2 | 14269 | Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives |
| 2.1 | p.3 | 14271 | Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF |
| 2.1 | p.4 | 14272 | I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? |
| 2.1 | p.5 | 14274 | Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism |
| 2.2 | p.5 | 14273 | Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' |
| 2.3 | p.6 | 14275 | Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics |
| 2.3 | p.7 | 14276 | The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true |
| 2.5 | p.9 | 14278 | Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe |
| 3.1 | p.11 | 14282 | On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A |
| 3.1 | p.11 | 14281 | A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% |
| 3.2 | p.14 | 14284 | Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments |
| 4.1 | p.19 | 14287 | Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? |
| 5 | p.29 | 14290 | Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! |