| 1996 | The Virtues and Human Nature |
| Intro | p.111 | 23144 | Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind |
| Full Idea: The behavioural aspects of virtue are more important than its phenomenology, because virtue is best defined along consequentialist lines. | |||
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], Intro) | |||
| A reaction: This is the thesis of her paper. Quite persuasive. Consequences are, of course, important in all moral theories (even Kant's). She doesn't rely on human nature. The social virtues vary according to the circumstances, such as gossiping in wartime. |
| 3 | p.117 | 23146 | Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions |
| Full Idea: Motives will cause persons for form intentions; it is intentions which more directly guide actions. | |||
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |||
| A reaction: This is invites the question of whether there is a sharp distinction between the motive and the action. Detectives look for motives, but law courts look for intentions. |
| 3 | p.119 | 23147 | Good intentions are not necessary for virtue |
| Full Idea: I deny the claim that good intentions are necessary for virtue. | |||
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |||
| A reaction: Presumably one could continually do the right thing, because it was your duty or your job, without actually being well motivated for it. |
| 3 | p.122 | 23148 | Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others |
| Full Idea: A moral virtue is a character trait (a disposition or cluster of dispositions) which, generally speaking, produces good consequences for others. | |||
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 3) | |||
| A reaction: There are self-directed virtues, such as keeping fit and healthy. There are virtues for ways to receive the kindness of others. That said, I like this idea. |
| 5 | p.125 | 23149 | If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue |
| Full Idea: If generosity towards the needy in the long run produced [social] parasites, and if generosity did this systematically, then it would not be a moral virtue. | |||
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |||
| A reaction: A very persuasive example. Hume has similar views - that we encourage those emotions which have good social outcomes. |
| 5 | p.126 | 23150 | Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity |
| Full Idea: Women now have more control over becoming pregnant. Men can now be more certain of paternity, without the constraint of female chastity. Hence chastity is no longer considered a moral virtue. | |||
| From: Julia Driver (The Virtues and Human Nature [1996], 5) | |||
| A reaction: A persuasive argument that virtues are defined by their consequences (to which I add my example of gossiping in wartime). Different social situations and crises promote or relegate the status of certain virtues (such as food hoarding). |