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Ideas of Keith Donnellan, by Text
[American, fl. 1975, Of the University of California at Los Angeles.]
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1966
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Reference and Definite Descriptions
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p.27
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7760
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Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Lycan]
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p.415
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10435
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A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Sainsbury]
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p.537
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10451
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Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach]
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§I
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p.43
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5811
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A definite description can have a non-referential use
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§III
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p.46
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5812
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Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out
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§IV
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p.52
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5813
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A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed
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§VI
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p.54
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5814
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'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence
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§VII
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p.58
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5815
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Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention
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