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Ideas of Tim Crane, by Text

[British, b.1962, Professor at University College, London.]

1995 Causation
1.3 p.187 8384 The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved
1.4.2 p.193 8386 Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences
1.4.2 p.193 8387 A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties
2001 Elements of Mind
1.4 p.11 4063 In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived.
1.5 p.18 4065 Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
1.7 p.24 4066 It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate
1.7 p.27 4067 Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
2.10 p.38 4069 Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
2.10 p.38 4070 Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
2.11 p.41 4071 Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow
2.12 p.48 4072 The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind
2.13 p.49 4073 Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone
2.14 p.51 4074 Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
2.14 p.52 4075 Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation
2.14 p.52 4076 Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
2.16 p.57 4077 Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties
2.16 p.58 4078 Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity
2.17 p.59 4079 Properties are causes
2.17 p.61 4080 If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one
2.18 p.64 4082 The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague
2.18 p.65 4083 If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete
2.18 p.66 4084 Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic
2.19 p.66 4085 Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution
2.9 p.35 4068 Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence
3.22 p.74 4087 Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes
3.24 p.81 4089 Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object
3.25 p.83 4090 Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional
3.26 p.89 4092 The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question
3.26 p.89 4091 The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality
3.28 p.95 4093 Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)
3.28 p.96 4094 Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience
4.31 p.105 4096 Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions
4.34 p.114 4095 Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes
4.35 p.117 4097 Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs
4.36 p.120 4098 The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent
4.37 p.126 4100 The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false.
5.40 p.131 4101 If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see
5.42 p.137 4102 The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum
5.42 p.138 4103 The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects
5.42 p.139 4104 One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine
5.43 p.142 4105 The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes
5.43 p.143 4106 If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes
5.44 p.146 4107 With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same
5.44 p.147 4108 Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
5.45 p.151 4109 If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual