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Ideas of Roderick Chisholm, by Text

[American, 1916 - 1999, Taught at Brown University, Long Island.]

1964 Human Freedom and the Self
p.93 9268 If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt]
p.24 p.24 3442 Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused
p.25 p.25 3443 Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires?
p.28 p.28 3445 Causation among objects relates either events or states
p.28 p.28 3444 If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person
p.32 p.32 3446 For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs
1964 The Myth of the Given
§12 p.118 8790 The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying
1966 Freedom and Action
p.83 20062 If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong
p.20 p.65 20054 There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent
1966 Theory of Knowledge (2nd ed 1977)
p.360 19569 We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Kvanvig]
1967 Identity through Possible Worlds
p.81-2 p.81 11965 Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa?
p.85 p.85 11966 If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are?
1976 Person and Object
Intro 1 p.15 15801 Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves
Intro 2 p.17 15802 I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout
Intro 4 p.20 15803 Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process
1.4 p.28 15806 The property of being identical with me is an individual concept
1.4 p.28 15804 If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine'
1.4 p.29 15808 A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics
1.4 p.29 15805 Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity
1.4 p.29 15807 A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity
1.4 p.30 15809 A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property
1.5 p.31 15810 Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves
1.5 p.33 15811 I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself'
1.5 p.36 15813 People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence
1.6 p.38 15814 A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities
1.8 p.47 15815 Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent'
1.8 p.49 15816 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book'
1.8 p.50 15817 If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'?
1.8 p.50 15818 So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them
1.8 p.51 15819 Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter?
2.2 p.58 15820 A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary
2.2 p.59 15821 Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition
2.3 p.60 15822 The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature
2.5 p.69 15823 Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation'
2.6 p.73 15824 There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission'
3.2 p.92 15826 There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ
3.4 p.100 15827 Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had'
4.1 p.114 15828 I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs
4.2 p.117 15829 The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted
4.2 p.119 15830 Some properties can never be had, like being a round square
4.4 p.124 15831 Explanations have states of affairs as their objects
4.6 p.127 15832 Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times
p.149 p.189 12852 If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Simons]
p.90 p.188 12851 Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Simons]
1996 A Realistic Theory of Categories
p.3 p.14 13120 Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Westerhoff]