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Ideas of Rudolph Carnap, by Text
[German, 1891 - 1970, Born at Ronsdorf, Germany. Pupil of Frege. Taught at the University of California. Quine and Kaplan were pupils.]
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1928
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The Logical Structure of the World (Aufbau)
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p.35
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18699
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Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Button]
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p.36
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12131
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All concepts can be derived from a few basics, making possible one science of everything [Brody]
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1934
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The Logical Syntax of Language
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§17
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p.78
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13251
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Each person is free to build their own logic, just by specifying a syntax
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p.88-
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p.414
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13342
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Carnap defined consequence by contradiction, but this is unintuitive and changes with substitution [Tarski]
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1935.12.04
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p.374
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18285
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All translation loses some content (but language does not create reality)
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1937
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Testability and Meaning
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I.440
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p.46
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14305
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In the truth-functional account a burnt-up match was soluble because it never entered water
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1947
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Meaning and Necessity
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p.90
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11968
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The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Kaplan]
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1950
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Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology
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p.41
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8960
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Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Szabó]
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p.129
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8748
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Logical positivists incorporated geometry into logicism, saying axioms are just definitions [Shapiro]
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1
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p.205
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13932
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Empiricists tend to reject abstract entities, and to feel sympathy with nominalism
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2
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p.206
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13933
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Existence questions are 'internal' (within a framework) or 'external' (concerning the whole framework)
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2
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p.207
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13934
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To be 'real' is to be an element of a system, so we cannot ask reality questions about the system itself
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2
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p.208
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13935
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We only accept 'things' within a language with formation, testing and acceptance rules
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2
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p.209
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13936
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Questions about numbers are answered by analysis, and are analytic, and hence logically true
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3
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p.214
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13937
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New linguistic claims about entities are not true or false, but just expedient, fruitful or successful
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4
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p.217
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13938
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A linguistic framework involves commitment to entities, so only commitment to the framework is in question
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4
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p.219
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13939
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No possible evidence could decide the reality of numbers, so it is a pseudo-question
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5
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p.221
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13940
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All linguistic forms in science are merely judged by their efficiency as instruments
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1950
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Logical Foundations of Probability
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Ch.1
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p.5
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13048
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Good explications are exact, fruitful, simple and similar to the explicandum [Salmon]
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1959
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Elimination of Metaphysics by Analysis of Language
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p.69
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16252
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Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements
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