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Ideas of Keith Campbell, by Text

[Australian, fl. 1990, At Sydney University.]

1981 The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars
§1 p.126 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
§1 p.126 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented
§1 p.127 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
§2 p.128 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
§3 p.129 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another
§3 p.129 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
§3 p.129 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved
§5 p.132 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible
§5 p.132 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
§6 p.133 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
§6 p.134 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
§6 p.135 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
§7 p.136 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
§8 p.138 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes