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Ideas of Laurence Bonjour, by Text
[American, b.1943, Professor at the University of Washington, at Seattle.]
1980
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Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge
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Intro
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p.10
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4255
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Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism
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§5
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p.27
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4261
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The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [PG]
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§I
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p.11
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4257
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The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
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§I
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p.11
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4256
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The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism
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§II
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p.15
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4258
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Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief
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§IV
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p.20
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4259
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External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational
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§IV
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p.20
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4260
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Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria
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1985
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The Structure of Empirical Knowledge
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5.1
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p.88
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21506
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A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth
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5.3
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p.99
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21508
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Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic
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5.5
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p.107
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21509
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There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems
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5.5
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p.107
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21510
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The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency
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5.5
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p.107
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21511
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A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence
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7.1
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p.141
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21503
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Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience
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7.2
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p.147
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21505
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A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility
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8.3
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p.171
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21504
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The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality
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1998
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In Defence of Pure Reason
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Pref
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p.-4
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3695
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Philosophy is a priori if it is anything
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§1.2
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p.10
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3696
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A priori justification requires understanding but no experience
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§1.3
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p.12
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3697
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The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity
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§3.5
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p.79
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3698
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Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief
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§3.6
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p.84
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3699
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The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements
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§3.7
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p.96
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3702
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Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism
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§3.7
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p.96
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3701
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Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs
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§3.7 n50
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p.92
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3700
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Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence
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§4.1
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p.98
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3703
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You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up
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§4.1
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p.99
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3704
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Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification
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§4.3
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p.110
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3651
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Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning
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§4.5
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p.119
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3706
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A priori justification can vary in degree
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§5.2
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p.131
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3707
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Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight
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§6.7
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p.180
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3708
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All thought represents either properties or indexicals
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§7.7
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p.214
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3709
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Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred
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2003
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A Version of Internalist Foundationalism
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1.4
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p.16
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8887
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It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization
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1.5
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p.21
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8888
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The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided
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2.1
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p.25
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8889
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Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge
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2.2
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p.27
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8890
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If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible
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3.1
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p.45
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8891
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My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics
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3.2
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p.53
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8892
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Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input
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3.2
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p.54
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8894
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Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth
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3.2
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p.54
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8893
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For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs
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4.2
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p.67
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8895
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If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present
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4.3
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p.73
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8896
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Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
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5.1 n3
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p.78
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8897
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The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data
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