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Ideas of Paul Boghossian, by Text

[American, b.1957, Professor at New York University.]

1990	The Status of Content

p.142

6345

Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Horwich]

1996	Analyticity Reconsidered

p.44

17721

There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Jenkins]

§I

p.3

9368

Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning

§I

p.3

9367

The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition

§I

p.4

9369

'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation

§II

p.8

9372

Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same?

§III

p.11

9373

That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants

§III

p.12

9374

If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long?

§III

p.13

9375

Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source

§III

p.14

9376

A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact

§III

p.16

9377

'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences

§III

p.16

9378

If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job?

§III

p.17

9380

We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it

n 6

p.21

9384

We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory