| 2000 | Knowledge:Readings in Cont.Epist |
| Pt.II Int | p.69 | 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief |
| Pt.III Int | p.231 | 3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress |
| Pt.III Int | p.232 | 3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic |
| Pt.III Int | p.232 | 3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology |
| Pt.IV Int | p.302 | 3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance |
| Pt.V Int | p.431 | 3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge |
| Pt.V Int | p.433 | 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived |
| Pt.V Int | p.434 | 3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories |
| Pt.V Int | p.434 | 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error |
| Pt.V Int | p.437 | 3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used |