green numbers give full details.     |    back to list of philosophers     |     expand these ideas

Ideas of Baron,S/Miller,K, by Text

[Australian, fl. 2019, at Australian universities]

2019 Intro to the Philosophy of Time
1.2 p.12 22986 The C-series rejects A and B, and just sees times as order by betweenness, without direction
1.3 p.15 22987 The past (unlike the future) is fixed, along with truths about it, by the existence of past objects
1.4 p.16 22988 The block universe theory says entities of all times exist, and time is the B-series
1.4 p.19 22989 Static time theory presents change as one property at t1, and a different property at t2
1.5.3 p.23 22990 The moving spotlight says entities can have properties of being present, past or future
1.6 p.25 22991 How can we know this is the present moment, if other times are real?
1.6 p.26 22992 If we are actually in the past then we shouldn't experience time passing
1.7.2 p.31 22993 For abstractionists past times might still exist, althought their objects don't
1.7.2 p.33 22994 Erzatz Presentism allows the existence of other times, with only the present 'actualised'
1.8 p.34 22995 Most of the sciences depend on the concept of time
2.1 p.39 22996 The A-series has to treat being past, present or future as properties
2.2 p.40 22997 The present moment is a matter of existence, not of acquiring a property
2.2 p.40 22998 How do presentists explain relations between things existing at different times?
2.3.1 p.43 22999 It is meaningless to measure the rate of time using time itself, and without a rate there is no flow
2.3.2 p.46 23000 Vicious regresses force you to another level; non-vicious imply another level
3.3.1 p.58 23001 The error theory of time's passage says it is either a misdescription or a false inference
4.2 p.95 23002 In relativity space and time depend on one's motion, but spacetime gives an invariant metric
5 p.121 23003 Static theories cannot account for time's obvious asymmetry, so time must be dynamic
5.3.1 p.130 23004 The direction of time is either primitive, or reducible to something else
5.3.2 p.132 23005 The kaon does not seem to be time-reversal invariant, unlike the rest of nature
5.3.3 p.133 23006 Maybe the past is just the direction of decreasing entropy
5.5 p.136 23007 The B-series can have a direction, as long as it does not arise from temporal flow
5.6 p.138 23008 Grounding is intended as a relation that fits dependences between things
5.6.1 p.139 23009 There is no second 'law' of thermodynamics; it just reflects probabilities of certain microstates
5.6.2 p.142 23010 We could explain time's direction by causation: past is the direction of causes, future of effects
6.1 p.148 23011 Modern accounts of causation involve either processes or counterfactuals
6.2.2 p.150 23013 The main process theory of causation says it is transference of mass, energy, momentum or charge
6.2.3 p.151 23014 If causes are processes, what is causation by omission? (Distinguish legal from scientific causes?)
6.3 p.157 23015 The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are
6.5 p.169 23016 Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system
7.2.2 p.181 23017 Presentism needs endurantism, because other theories imply most of the object doesn't exist
7.3.1 p.182 23018 How does a changing object retain identity or have incompatible properties over time?
8.2 p.201 23020 If a time traveller kills his youthful grandfather, he both exists and fails to exist
8.3.1 p.213 23022 Presentism means there no existing past for a time traveller to visit
8.3.1 p.213 23023 How can presentists move to the next future moment, if that doesn't exist?
8.6 p.225 23024 A traveller takes a copy of a picture into the past, gives it the artist, who then creates the original!