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Ideas of M.R. Ayers, by Text

[British, fl. 1975, Professor at Oxford University, and fellow of Wadham College.]

1974	Individuals without Sortals

Intro

p.113

17509

Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference

Intro

p.114

17510

Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it

Intro

p.117

17511

Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use

'Concl'

p.144

17520

Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them

'Concl'

p.144

17521

You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object

'Concl'

p.146

17522

We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity

'Concl'

p.147

17523

Sortals basically apply to individuals

'Counting'

p.139

17519

To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'

'Counting'

p.139

17518

Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope

'Prob'

p.119

17512

If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?

'Prob'

p.120

17513

If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous

'Prob'

p.122

17514

Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged

'Realist' vi

p.131

17515

Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts

'Realist' vii

p.131

17516

If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?

'Realist' vii

p.132

17517

Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?