8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson] |
14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
10370 | Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J] |
3445 | Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm] |
10363 | Causation is relative to how we describe the primary relata [Anscombe, by Schaffer,J] |
4784 | Salmon says processes rather than events should be basic in a theory of physical causation [Salmon, by Psillos] |
8411 | Instead of localised events, I take enduring and extended processes as basic to causation [Salmon] |
15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
8342 | Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie] |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8542 | If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
7853 | Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs [Papineau] |
7857 | Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars [Papineau] |
8517 | Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K] |
8516 | Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |
10361 | Events are fairly course-grained (just saying 'hello'), unlike facts (like saying 'hello' loudly) [Schaffer,J] |
10360 | Causal relata are events - or facts, features, tropes, states, situations or aspects [Schaffer,J] |
10362 | One may defend three or four causal relata, as in 'c causes e rather than e*' [Schaffer,J] |
10368 | If causal relata must be in nature and fine-grained, neither facts nor events will do [Schaffer,J] |
10383 | The relata of causation (such as events) need properties as explanation, which need causation! [Schaffer,J] |
23787 | If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE] |
14533 | Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum] |
14558 | A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum] |
14559 | Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14565 | Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum] |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |