3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
3417 | Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim] |
3419 | Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim] |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
6147 | The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties [Merricks] |
6146 | Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties [Merricks] |
14711 | Rationalists say knowing an expression is identifying its extension using an internal cognitive state [Schroeter] |