| 12995 | The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know [Leibniz] |
| 12807 | The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances [Leibniz] |
| 7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
| 7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
| 4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
| 9168 | I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else [Putnam] |
| 5820 | 'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here [Putnam] |
| 7612 | Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam] |
| 8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
| 8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
| 6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
| 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
| 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
| 3416 | Content may match several things in the environment [Kim] |
| 3418 | 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim] |
| 3421 | Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim] |
| 16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
| 16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
| 3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
| 3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
| 2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
| 3982 | How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor] |
| 7884 | Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content [Papineau] |
| 7863 | If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions? [Papineau] |
| 8248 | Phenomenology says thought is part of the world [Deleuze/Guattari] |
| 3207 | Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object [Rey] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
| 4922 | Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions [Edelman/Tononi] |
| 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
| 3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
| 3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
| 3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
| 3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
| 3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
| 19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |