5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
22331 | Moral statements are imperatives rather than to avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock] |
22484 | Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot] |
2855 | In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B] |
4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
4134 | The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B] |
2865 | Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn] |
2854 | Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B] |