10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
6264 | In Tarski's definition, you understand 'true' if you accept the notions of the object language [Putnam] |
6265 | Tarski has given a correct account of the formal logic of 'true', but there is more to the concept [Putnam] |
6269 | Only Tarski has found a way to define 'true' [Putnam] |
2345 | Semantic notions do not occur in Tarski's definitions, but assessing their correctness involves translation [Putnam] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
15343 | Kripke offers a semantic theory of truth (involving models) [Kripke, by Horsten] |
15327 | Kripke's semantic theory has actually inspired promising axiomatic theories [Kripke, by Horsten] |
10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
14968 | A weakened classical language can contain its own truth predicate [Gupta] |
13503 | A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD] |
10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
16337 | Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach] |
19127 | The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh] |