2360 | 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes] |
6234 | If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury] |
22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
6196 | People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant] |
20237 | Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche] |
20238 | Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche] |
21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
23689 | Moral words have an inherited power from expressing attitudes in emotional situations [Stevenson,CL] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
22486 | The mistake is to think good grounds aren't enough for moral judgement, which also needs feelings [Foot] |
22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
24007 | Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B] |
8035 | In trying to explain the type of approval involved, emotivists are either silent, or viciously circular [MacIntyre] |
8037 | The expression of feeling in a sentence is in its use, not in its meaning [MacIntyre] |
8040 | Emotivism cannot explain the logical terms in moral discourse ('therefore', 'if..then') [MacIntyre] |
8042 | Nowadays most people are emotivists, and it is embodied in our culture [MacIntyre] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |
4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |